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Back to the Future:
Learning from the Past in the Database Debate
PAULA BARON*
The appropriate form of legal protection for databases has been increasingly
contentious since the early 1990s. A very high level ofprotection for databases,
as seen in the EU Directive and the sui generis database protection proposals
modelled upon it, could effectively result in the database owner acquiring a
monopoly in the information contained within the database. On the other hand,
failure to protect databases adequately could result in an increase in market
failure as original databases, particularly electronic databases, are vulnerable
to misappropriation. In such cases, database production could decline.
Alternatively, database owners may adopt contractual and/or technological
measures of protection that would deny public access to the information
contained in databases.
In this paper, the author argues that "pre-modern" copyright cases, that is,
copyright cases decided, in the main, prior to 1850, may provide a potentially
effective model of protection for databases. In these early cases judges were
careful, in their grant of copyright, to avoid the trap of granting a proprietary
right in information. Infringement would be established only where a second
comer's use of a work was illegitimate, this issue being determined by the extent
to which the subsequent work was intended to substitute, or would prejudice the
commercial value of, the original work New works based on existing ones were
encouraged and non-competing uses did not constitute infringement.
A sui generis database scheme based upon the principles of these cases,
coupled with a shorter period of protection than is available under copyright,
could provide the balance between access and incentive that has proved so
elusive.
* Senior Lecturer, Law School, University of Western Australia.
OHIO STATE LA WJOURIVAL
[Wihile I shall think myself bound to secure every man in the enjoyment of
his copyright, one must not put manacles upon science.
-Lord Elenborough, Cary v. Kearsley
4 Esp. 168, 170-171; 170 ER 679,680.
I. INTRODUCTION
Although fact-based works have long been the subject of some contention in
copyright database protection has been of concern since at least the early 1990s.
In particular, two developments fostered debate: the European Database
Directive,1 which proposed a very stringent database protection regime, and the
decision in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service,2 which denied
copyright protection to anything other than the original aspects of selection and
arrangement in databases. These two developments highlight the central problem
of database protection: how do we provide sufficient legal protection for database
makers to ensure that databases are produced? At the same time, how do we
ensure that legal protection does not stifle knowledge and progress by denying
public access to database contents?
My argument in this paper is that early copyright cases may provide an
effective model for the protection of databases. This is because these cases were
careful, in their grant of copyright, to avoid the trap of granting a proprietary right
in information. Infringement would be established only where a second comer's
use of a work was illegitimate. Illegitimacy of use was determined by the extent
to which the subsequent work was intended to substitute, or would prejudice the
commercial value of, the original work. New works based on existing ones were
encouraged and non-competing uses did not constitute infringement.
In proposing this argument, I am not suggesting that databases should
necessarily be protected under existing copyright regimes. Rather, my argument
is that it would be desirable to introduce sui generis legislation based upon early
copyright principles. Such a model would ensure protection against market failure
for database owners, while protecting the public interest in the information
databases contain. Most existing sui generis models, however, tend to be extreme
reactions to the perceived underprotection of databases. They have the potential to
undermine the common good significantly by granting exclusive monopolies in
databases and thus in the information that they contain.
The paper supports the works of such commentators as Reichman, Uhlir, and
Samuelson, 3 who have argued against the overprotection of databases by existing
1 Council Directive 96/9, 1996 O.3. (L77/20).
2 499 U.S. 340,362 (1991).
3 J.H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, Database Protection at the Crossroads: Recent
Developments and Their Impact on Science and Technology, 14 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 793,
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sui generis proposals, and Ginsburg,4 who has argued for a better understanding
of copyright principles and their application to databases. Its specific focus,
however, is on the form of protection offered to factual works in early copyright
cases. Its scope is limited to a general consideration of the principles of protection
in these cases, and their potential application to databases. Its recommendations
are formulated with both the United States and the Australian jurisdictions in
mind. For this reason, both jurisdictions will be cited when making references to
existing legal principles and legislation.
There are some limitations to the scope of this paper. First, the paper does not
seek to provide a definitive model of database protection. Rather, its purpose is to
contribute to the current debate by providing some insights into early copyright
decisions. Second, any constitutional limitations that may impact upon the ability
of the United States Congress to implement sui generis database protection 5 will
not be considered. Third, the particular problems of international harmonization
of database law will not be addressed other than in a general sense.
Part II of this paper will outline the issues raised by database protection and
examine the assumptions that underlie the current database debate; Part III will
outline the ways in which databases are currently protected by law; and Part IV
will examine the protection extended to fact-based works in early copyright cases.
The paper concludes with some suggestions for a model of database protection
based upon early copyright principles.
II. THE DATABASE PROTECTION DEBATE
A dictionary definition of "data" is "known facts or things used as a basis for
inference or reckoning, quantities or characters operated on by a computer.' 6 A
database, in turn, is defined as "a structured set of data held in a computer,
especially one that is accessible in various ways."7 Data is "compiled," that is,
collected or accumulated into a database.8
837-38 (1999); J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50
VAND. L. REV. 51, 55 (1997).
4 Jane C. Ginsburg Copyright, Common Law, and sui generis Protection of Databases in
the United States and Abroad, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 151, 152 (1997) [hereinafter Protection of
Databases]; Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of
Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865, 1871 (1990) [hereinafter Ginsburg; Creation
and Commercial Value].
5 See Terry M. Sanks, Database Protection: National and International Attempts to
Provide LegalProtectionfor Databases, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 991, 1011-12 (1998).
6 THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF CURRENT ENGLISH 294 (8th ed. 1990). The word
is derived from the Latin past participle of "dare, " give.
7 This definition tends to be misleading:, a database does not have to be in electronic form.
Paper-based databases, such as phone books and television directories, are still in common use.
2001]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
Prior to the widespread use of computer technology, compilations and lists
existed primarily on paper.9 They were prepared by the labor-intensive process of
using filing and card-index systems.10 Since the 1960s, compiling on computers
has made this process considerably easier. Electronic compilation offers faster
retrieval speed, greater storage capacity, and increased ease and accuracy of
information. 11 Further technological developments have contributed to the
widespread usage of databases. For instance, the ready availability of scanners
and other equipment enables the conversion of print compilations to electronic
For practical purposes, however, even these are being overtaken by intemet databases. The
European Database Directive also defines a database as "a collection of independent works,
data or other independent materials arranged in a systematic or methodical way and capable of
being accessed by electronic or other means." Council Directive 96/9, art. 1(1), 1996 OJ. (L
77/20) 24. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Draft Treaty, art. 2(1) WIPO
Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996), included non-electronic databases in its scope. It defined a
database as "a collection of independent works, data or other materials arranged in a systematic
or methodical way and capable of being accessed by electronic or other means." The recent
United States proposals also adopt wide definitions. See The Consumer and Investor Access to
Information Act, H.R. 1858, 106th Cong. § 101(1)(A) (1999). The bill defined "database' as:
a collection of a large number of discrete items of information that have been collected and
organized in a single place, or in such a way as to be accessible through a single source, through
the investment of substantial monetary or other resources, for the purpose of providing access to
those discrete items of information by users of the database. Such term does not include works
that are combined and ordered in a logical progression or other meaningful way in order to tell a
story, communicate a message, represent an idea, or achieve a result.
d ; see also The Collections of Information Antipiracy Act, H.R. 354, 106th Cong. § 1401(1)
(1999) (using the term "collection of information," rather than database, to mean "information
that has been collected and has been organized for the purpose of bringing discrete items of
information together in one place or through one source so that persons may access them"); Ia
§ 1401(2) (defining 'information" as "facts, data, works of authorship, or any other intangible
material capable of being collected and organized in a systematic way"). In Australia, the
Copyright Law Review Committee (CLRC) and the Copyright Convergence Group (CCG)
also took the view that "databases," for the purposes of legal protection, could be electronic or
non-electronic. See CLRC, COMPuTER SOFrWARE PROTECrION para. 14.03 (Apr. 1995); CCG,
HIGHWAYS TO CHANGE-COPYRIGHT IN THE NEW COMMUNICATIONS ENVIRONMENT 6 (Aug.
1994).
8 Ironically, "compile" is derived originally from the Latin for "plunder or plagiarize."
OXFORD DICTIONARY, supra note 6, at 232.
9 Sanks, supra note 5, at 991.
10 Clive D. Thome, The Infringement of Database Compilations: A Case for Reform?, 9
EuR. INELL PROP. REV. 331, 331 (1991). They were also difficult to reproduce, thus providing
an built-in deterrent to copyright infringement. See Natalia Yastreboff, Copyright for Online
Databases on the Internet (Oct. 1997), available at http'//www.gtlaw.com.au/pubs/
copyrightonline.html (originally published in AUsTL. INTELL PROP. L. BULL (May 1996)).
11 Jack B. Hicks, Copyright and Computer Databases: Is Traditional Compilation Law
Adequate?, 65 TEx. L. REV. 993, 995 (1987); Sanks, supra note 5, at 992.
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form.1 2 The availability of telecommunications, particularly the Intemet,13
enables easy dissemination of data products. This leads to the rapid production of
technological innovations, and in turn, the generation of more data. Electronic
publishing thus potentially makes both data and research results available at very
low costs worldwide.14
It is hardly surprising, then, that the database market appears to be growing
rapidly. Although it is difficult to identify the "database market" with precision,
Hunsucker observes that commercial competition is waged in at least three broad
markets.15 These are the "one-stop-shopping market," where general information
content is offered to a broad customer base; the "problem-focused" market, where
specific information content focused on particular problems is offered to industry
groups; and the "industry-focused" market where both general and specific
information content is offered to specific industry and professional markets. The
data collection costs within these three markets varies and in turn pricing
structures may vary within market segments. 16 Reichman and Samuelson17 note,
however, the anecdotal evidence that suggests that the market for commercially
distributed databases tends to be characterized by a lack of competition. A
database originator, once the initial investment has been made in the database,
tends to take the relevant market segment as a whole. When a database maker is
the sole source of the relevant data, digital technology can strengthen this
12 Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 3, at 67. Digital technologies have also
revolutionized the nature of information that can be stored in database form. Virtually anything
that can be converted to a digital form, such as compact disks and graphic images, can be the
subject of database access. Yastreboff, supra note 10.
13 The Internet is a worldwide network of interconnected small computer networks,
developed from the United States Department of Defense's Advanced Research Project
Association Network (ARPANET). Sanks, supra note 5, at 992 n.7; Yastreboff, supra note 10.
14 Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 3, at 65.
15 G.M. Hunsucker, The European Database Directive: Regional Stepping Stone to an
International Model?, 7 FORDHAM DITELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.. 697,712 (1997). This is
not the only way that the database industry can be classified. See Yastreboff, supra note 10
(referring to industry practices based upon three database compilation models: the hierarchical
model, the relational model, and the network model).
16 As a general rule, database makers in the "one-stop shopping" market serve a broad
market and incur lower data collection costs, so access fees are lower, database owners
providing specialized information to a narrower market incur higher collection costs and so
charge higher access fees. Hunsucker, supra note 15, at 712. Pricing models vary. database
owners may charge a basic fee for unlimited access; or a basic fee for a fixed level of access and
addition time based fees thereafter, or may charge on the number of searches performed or the
volume of information retrieved or extracted. Alternatively, they may allow free public access
to some information, and charge for access to more specialized information. Some database
owners may charge by a mixture of such methods. Id at 713.
17 Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 3, at 70.
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dominant market position. At the same time, the technologies that facilitate the
creation of databases also facilitate their piracy.
As I noted in my introduction, the database debate surfaced with the
European Union Directive, which proposed a very highly protective database
regime, and the decision in Feist, which denied copyright protection to anything
other than the original aspects of selection and arrangement in databases. The
ensuing debate has revolved around the central tension between incentive and
access highlighted by these two events.
There are at least three assumptions that underlie this debate that should be
made overt. First, databases are socially useful and society should encourage their
production; second, investment in, and development of, databases can be
encouraged by well-designed legal protection; and third, legal protection should
not grant a monopoly in database contents so as to deny access to those who
would build upon prior knowledge or to stifle the free flow of information.
A. Databases Are Socially Useful and Should Be the Subject of
Investment
It is difficult to deny the ubiquitous 8 and socially useful nature of databases.
Numerous commentators have already noted the importance of databases to our
economy19 and to our cultural, scientific, and technical progress. 0 Given this
18 Databases, like other types of intellectual property, are indivisible, inexhaustible, and
ubiquitous. See J.H. Reichman, Charting the Collapse of the Patent-Copyright Dichotomy:
Premises for a Restructured International Property System, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. LJ.
475,486 (1995); Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 3, at 59 n37. As Thomas Jefferson noted:
If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others of exclusive property, it is the
action of the thinking power, which an individual may exclusively possess as long as he keeps it
to himself-, but the moment it is divulged, it forces itself into possession of everyone, and the
receiver cannot dispossess himself of it
Thomas Jefferson, quoted in T. Barlow, Selling Wine without Bottles-The Economy of Mind
on the Global Net, 7 AUsTL. INTELL. PROP. L. BuLL 2, 2 (1994). But see COMM. ON
INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS AND THE EMERGING INFO. INFRAsTRUCrURE, NAT'L RESEARCH
COUNCI, THE DIGrrAL DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE xxii
(2000) [hereinafter DIGrrAL DILEMMA] (explaining that electronic information goods are not
necessarily irrevocable, fixed, or public in the same way as physical goods; access can be
withheld at the discretion of the publisher, and old versions are often overwritten by new). The
executive summary to Digital Dilemma is reprinted in this issue. 62 OHIo ST. L.J 951 (2001).
19 J-H. Reichrnan, Electronic Information Tools-The Outer Edge of World Intellectual
Property Law, 17 U. DAYTON L. REv. 797, 820 (1992) ("electronic information processing
constitutes the engine of twenty-first century economic development'). Between 1991 and
1997, the number of databases in the U.S. increased from 7,637 to 10,338. There has also been
a marked commercialization of the database industry. In 1977,78% of databases were produced
by the public sector, but by 1997 this figure had dropped to 22% while the private sector share
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social utility, it is also hard to argue with the proposition that we should
encourage investment in databases.21
However, database investment may be suboptimal22 if market failure occurs.
Market failure has always been a problem for creative works that may be copied
easily.2 3 The vulnerability of products that bear their know-how on their face
enables second comers to undercut the originator in the market This is because
the second comer does not need to cover the costs incurred by the originator. The
originator, therefore, lacks a natural lead-time in which to recoup his or her
investment and make a profit Thus, database authors could find their economic
returns too small to justify the cost of creating a database, and they may be
dissuaded from creating further databases.24
increased to 78%. See DR. MARTHA E. WILLIAMS, THE STATE OF DATABASES TODAY (1999),
quoted in HR. REP. No. 106-350, at 9 (1999).
20 See HR. REP. NO. 106-349, at 9 (1999) ("[D]atabases are essential tools for improving
productivity, advancing education and training. They are also the linchpins of a world-leading
dynamic commercial information industry in the United States'); HR. REP. No. 106-350, at 8
(1999) ("The culture of science involves combining new data with existing databases to create
more powerful research tools. Allowing scientists to reuse facts, rather than requiring them to
'reinvent the wheel,' ensures that research moves forward. Research and development is an
important foundation for all commercial activity."); Preamble, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug.
30, 1996) ("Databases are . . . an essential tool for promoting economic, cultural and
technological advancement").
21 HR. REP. No. 106-349, at 10 (1999):
Developing, compiling, distributing and maintaining commercially significant collections
requires substantial investments of time, personnel, and effort and money.... But several recent
legal and technological developments threaten to derail this progress by eroding the incentives
for continued investment needed to maintain and build upon the U.S. lead in world markets for
electronic information resources.
22 Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyrght's Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND.
L. REV. 483, 492 (1996) (arguing that, under its present scope, copyright provides more
protection for creativity and labor when invested in an entertaining work than when invested in
a useful product). In consequence, we have too many entertaining works, at the expense of
having too little of everything else. Failure to protect databases could aggravate this problem.
Iad
23 This has long been recognized by intellectual property law. One of the early arguments
for intellectual property protection focused upon the ease with which a work could be copied. In
practical terms, the need to reverse engineer inventions provided them with a natural lead-time
that books did not have. Thus, the legal protection of machines on this argument was less
significant than was the case with books. BRAD SHERMAN & LIONEL BENTLY, THE MAKING OF
MODERN TNTELECAL PROPERTYLAW: THE BRrIMSH ExPERENCF, 1760-1911, at 147 (1999).
2 4 Reichman, supra note 19, at 835.
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As noted above, new technologies not only facilitate database creation but
also exacerbate market failure. Copying, remanipulation,25 and dissemination are
facilitated by new technologies. Thus, the ability to infringe copyright in database
compilations has increased. At the same time, the incentive to do so has increased
because of the potential financial rewards offered by successful infiingement. 6
An online database faces different challenges to one produced on a form of
secondary storage, such as a CD-ROM: detection of infringement is more
difficult; and the parts taken may not be substantial, thus making it difficult for a
plaintiff to sustain an action for copyright infringement z7
Database piracy may not necessarily be motivated by financial reward. A
number of commentators have already noted the problems posed by "information
Samaritans." These are parties who, for non-economic reasons, take data from
databases without the authorization of the database owner, and make it freely
available to the public. 8
Database piracy may deter investment in databases, and consequently
database owners increase the pressure for legal protection. Legal protection also
has an international dimension. The failure of particular nations to provide
adequate legal protection could disadvantage them in the international trade arena
if other nations introduce more rigorous database protection2 9 This brings me to
the second assumption in the database debate.
25 New technologies facilitate not only re-manipulation to avoid infringement but also the
preparation of derivative works. See Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value, supra note 4,
at 1902-03.
26 Thome, supra note 10, at 331.
27 The facilitation of extraction, redistribution, and recombination of several databases
may mean that segments are more likely to be taken instead of the entire database. Ann
Monotti, Copyright Protection of Computerised Databases, 3 AUSTL INTELL. PROP. J. 135, 157
(1992).
28 Hunsucker, supra note 15, at 702. As an illustration of this problem in the context of
computer software, see United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535, 536 (D. Mass. 1994). In
this case, LaMacchia devised a scheme to allow free dissemination of popular software and
games through an electronic bulletin board. Hunsucker argues that the behavior of such
information samaritans destroys incentive to produce databases just as much as does
"traditional" piracy.
29 106 H.R. REP. No. 106-349, at 10-11 (1999):
[The EU Directive] creates a new sui generis form of property right for the legal protection of
databases to supplement copyright However, it denies this new protection to collections of
information originating in the U.S. or other countries unless the other country offers
"comparable" protection to collections originating in the European Union. When fully
implemented, the European Directive could place United States firms at an enormous
competitive disadvantage throughout the entire European market.
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B. Investment in Databases Can Be Encouraged by Well-Designed Legal
Protection
Proponents of increased legal protection for databases argue that, without
legal protection, there will be less incentive to create databases. They also argue
that the quality of databases that are created will deteriorate. This is because fewer
individuals will invest the time and money necessary to develop and maintain
new and improved databases.30 There is no very clear evidence, however, to
show that well-designed legal protection will encourage database protection.
Indeed, despite the allegation of underprotection of databases in the United States
since Feist, the database industry has flourished.31 On the other hand, the
traditional domination of the database market by the United States and the United
Kingdom has been attributed to their strong copyright protection of databases. 32
The assumption that resources can be directed into the production of socially
desirable works is the traditional justification for intellectual property regimes
generally,33 and copyright protection in particular.34 Copyright regimes35
generally create a right in the owner of sufficiently original36 "artistic" or
30 Sanks, supra note 5, at 993; see also Yastreboff, supra note 10 (arguing that there is an
oversupply of databases on the Intemet, but a lack of quality databases available freely. "This
may reflect the unwillingness of people to invest into the production of quality databases on the
Internet due to the perceived ineffectiveness of copyright protection in this area.").
31 See supra note 19. Some parties opposed to increased protection have argued that
existing legal, contractual, and technological protections are sufficient U.S. COPYRIGHT
OFFICE, REPORT ON LEGAL PROTECrION FOR DATABAsES: A REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF
COPYRIGHTS 68 (1997). It has also been argued that adequate incentives already exist for
compilations, and market failure can be corrected in various ways. Original compilers can
recoup their costs in ways other than selling the information. See Alfred C. Yen, The Legacy of
Feist: Consequences of the Weak Connection between Copyright and the Economics of Public
Goods, 52 OHIO ST. LJ. 1343, 1369-71 (1991).
3 2 Hunsucker, supra note 15, at 704 n.1 I (quoting 1995 figures that showed that Great
Britain garnered 65% of the revenues from the European Union database market going on to
pose the question as to whether it is merely a coincidence that the two countries with the
greatest database market share, Great Britain and the United States, have traditionally granted
strong copyright protection to such works under the "sweat of the brow" theory).
33 Reichman, supra note 18, at 480-96.
3 4 For a comprehensive discussion of the incentive/access balance in copyright, see
Lunney, supra note 22. Some commentators, however, have questioned the economic necessity
for copyright. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright
in Books, Photocopies and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970).
35 Copyright Act, 1968 (Austl.); Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 etseq. (1994 &
Supp. IV 1998).
36 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994); Copyright Act, 1968 ch. 2 (Austl.). "Originality" in the
United Kingdom and Australia means only that the work should originate with the author, that
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"literary" works37 and creative effort other than works, such as films or sound
recordings,38 to prevent unauthorized copying of the work or effort protected. The
period of copyright is relatively long.39 The author, however, does not have a
monopoly upon the use of the work in the sense that a patent provides such a
monopoly.40 Another author may independently create a similar work without
penalty.4 1
Copyright is at odds with competition policies to the extent that it creates an
exclusive property right in creative effort.42 Its continued existence is traditionally
justified on the basis that a limited monopoly43 right is necessary to act as an
is, that the work is not a copy of an existing work. Univ. of London Press Ltd. v. Univ. Tutorial
Press Ltd. (1916) 2 Ch. 601; Kalamazoo (Aus) Pty. Ltd. v. Compact Bus. Sys. Pty. Ltd. (1985)
5 LP.R. 213. In the United States, works must be original in the sense of originating from the
author, and possess a minimum standard of creativity. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv.
Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). This requirement can be traced to Supreme Court decisions in
the late nineteenth century. See, e.g., Iiggins v. Keuffel, 140 U.S. 428 (1891); Burrow-Giles
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
37 These terms are used in a very wide sense. See, e.g., Ladbroke (Football) Ltd. v.
William Hill (Football) Ltd. (1964) 1 W.L.R. 273 (football coupons as literary works); Sands &
McDougall Pty. Ltd. v. Robinson (1917) 23 C.L.R. 49 (a map as an artistic work); Kalamazoo
(Aus) Pty. Ltd. v. Compact Bus. Sys. Pty. Ltd. (1985) 5 I.P.R. 213 (accounting forms as literary
works); Univ. of London Press Ltd. v. Univ. Tutorial Press Ltd. (1916) 2 Ch. 601 (examination
papers as literary works).
38 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994); Copyright Act, 1968 div. 6 (Austl.).
39 17 U.S.C. § 304 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); Copyright Act, 1968 § 33 (Austl.).
40 Patent regimes protect not only against copying, but against independent creation. 35
U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1994); Patents Act, 1990 (Austl.).
41 Corelli v. Gray (1913) 29 T.L.R. 570.
42Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the
Restitutionay Impulse, 78 VA. L. REv. 149, 158 (1992).
43 See Millar v. Taylor (1769) 4 Burr. 157, 196 (Yates, J., dissenting):
"'That every man is intitled to the fruits of his own labour," I readily admit. But he can only be
entitled to this, according to the fixed constitution of things; and subject to the general rights of
mankind, and the general rules of property. He must not expect that these fruits shall be eternal;
that he is to monopolize them to infinity; that every vegetation and increase shall be confined to
hiinselfalone, and never revert to the common mass.
In the United States context, see Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417,429 (1984), reh'g denied, 465 U.S. 1112 (1984):
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily
designed to provide a special private benefit Rather, the limited grant is a means by which an
important public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative activity of
authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the
products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired.
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incentive44 for authors to produce and disseminate more works. 45 Its
anticompetitive effects are also tolerated on public policy grounds because
copyright leaves facts and ideas in the public domain.46 This allows competitors
to produce diverse works from the same raw material.47 Even the particular
expression of the work enters the public domain at the expiry of the term of
copyright protection. 8 Further, the monopolistic effects of copyright are
ameliorated by fair use exceptions 49 that excuse certain unauthorized uses that are
considered to be socially beneficial 0
44 The quid pro quo inherent in copyright, that is, the benefits that flow to the author are
given in return for public access to the author's work, is discussed at length by Robert A.
Kreiss, Accessability and Commercialization in Copyright Theory, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1995);
see also DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 18, at xxii (concluding that the tradition of providing for
a degree of access to published materials, established in the world of physical artifacts, should
be continued in the digital context).
4 5 Lunney, supra note 22, at 485. Some commentators have observed, however, that the
incentive to create new works may not be affected by copyright protection. See, e.g., Reichman
& Samuelson, supra note 3 at 59 n.35, who argue that most compilers of scientific data have
been more concerned with credit or recognition for their work, than securing the economic
advantages that may attach to that work This is a point recognized early in copyright
history- "Many of our best and noblest authors have published their works from more generous
views than pecuniary profit. Some have written for fame, and the benefit of mankind."
Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 676 (1834) (Thompson, L, dissenting); see also Kreiss, supra
note 44, at 16 (emphasizing that commercialization, rather than creation of works is the focus of
copyright regimes; also considering the argument that some authors are not motivated by
economic considerations to be irrelevant-most authors put in the hard work because of the
potential to earn income from the commercialization of new works); Alfred C. Yen, Restoring
the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. LJ. 517, 537 (1990)
(arguing that the fact that copyright extends protection to works for which no economic
incentive is required to induce creation is merely evidence of the natural law tradition in
copyright).
4 6 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) ("By
establishing a marketable right to the use of one's expression, copyright supplies the economic
incentive to create and disseminate ideas.'); see also Wendy I Gordon, supra note 42, at 154
n.19. For a comprehensive discussion of copyright and the public domain, see Jessica Litman,
The Public Domain, 39 EMoRY L. 965 (1990).
4 7 Kreiss, supra note 44, at 5.
4 8 Generally, the term of copyright protection for works and other creative effort is the life
of the author plus a defined term of around fifty to seventy years, depending upon the
jurisdiction. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-05 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); Copyright Act, 1968 §§ 33,
93-96 (Austl.).
4 9 See Kreiss, supra note 44, at 5. In the Australian context, the Copyright Act, 1968
§§ 40-42 (Austl.), provides specific exceptions to infringement for the fair dealings of research
or study, criticism or review, and news reporting. There is, however, no general "fair use'
provision as in the United States. In the United States, 17 U.S.C. § 107 allows reuse of
copyright expression for the purposes of criticism, classroom, or research use and parody.
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However, the balance between incentive and access is a fine one.51 In
particular, subject matter that falls somewhere between the traditional
copyright/patent regimes52 creates difficulties for legal regimes. Legal protection
needs to be designed carefully 53 so as to avoid the cycle of overprotection and
underprotection that characterizes such legal hybrids.54 The design of such
protection is particularly difficult in the case of subject matter in which innovation
Section 108 of the Copyright Act allows for library copying privileges. Section 109(a) gives a
limitation of exclusive distribution right to first sale of copy for most works, and Section 110
provides that public performance and display may be exempted for non-profit activities and
organizations.
50 Reichman, supra note 19, at 821.
51 A point taken up in DIGrrAL DILEMMA, supra note 18, at xviii-xix, observing that, "The
information infrastructure has... the potential to demolish a careful balancing of public good
and private interest that has emerged from the evolution of U.S. intellectual property law over
the past 200 years.' The report claims that the challenge is to provide sufficient control to
authors to motivate them; but not so much control as to threaten important policy goals. The
balance is not, however, straightforward. For instance, see Polivy who notes that the argument
for public access to fact works such as databases can be turned on its head, so as to argue that
societal need for fact works justifies greater incentives for authors. Denise R. Polivy, Feist
Applied: Imagination Protects, but Perspiration Persists-The Bases of Copyright Protection
for Factual Compilations, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 773 (1998).
52 J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 2432 (1994). Reichman has argued that electronic information works, such as
databases, function in a way more analogous to tools than to literary works and often exhibit the
same low levels of creative authorship that characterize the bulk of commercial designs. See
Reichman, supra note 19, at 801. This was a point recognized in Australia in the report of the
CLRC, 1995, 245-47, which noted that "computer-generated materials' be removed from the
"works" paradigm of the Copyright Act, 1968 (Austl.) and transferred within a new category of
"subject-matter other than works." "Computer-generated" was defined in Recommendation
2.42(b) as meaning "that the material is generated by computer in circumstances such that there
is no human author of the material" However, "works" would still include works made with
the assistance of computer programs. These recommendations have not been implemented to
date.
53 Often, the adoption of suigeneris legislation is the result of trade-related concerns, and
something of a "knee jerk" reaction. This was certainly the case in Australia with the Designs
Act, 1906 (Austl.), a tiresomely untidy piece of legislation adopted so that Australia could take
the benefit of the Paris Convention. Its reform has occupied numerous review committees over
many years with little success. See also P. Baron, Where Art Meets Science and Beauty Meets
Utility: The Strange World of Industrial Design Protection, 18 U. TAS. L. REV. 194, 204
(1999).
54 With regard to databases and similar electronic information tools, Reichman argues that
chronic underprotection could give way to bouts of overprotection as courts try to fill the gap in
intellectual property law with expansive applications of unfair competition law. Reichman,
supra note 19, at 803.
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is incremental or cumulative in nature.55 A monopoly in the underlying ideas or
facts could prevent further development. Most of the sui generis schemes or
proposals of database protection have been criticized for overprotecting
databases.5 6 Many would restrict traditional "fair uses," such as use or extraction
for research purposes.57 This brings me to the third assumption: that legal
protection should not give the database owner a monopoly in the database
contents.
C. Any Scheme of Legal Protection Should Not Prevent Public Access to
Database Contents, or Impair the Free Flow ofInformation
Although it is considered socially desirable to encourage database production,
it is also considered socially desirable that information and ideas remain in the
public domain. It is necessary that facts and ideas remain accessible58 to
consumers and competitors so as to increase knowledge and produce more
informational goods.59 Even proponents of strong database protection assume that
some degree of public access to information is necessary.60
The principle that legal protection of private interests should not impede
information flows has long been a central principle of copyright protection. As
noted above, copyright protects only the expression of a work, and gives no
monopoly to the ideas or facts contained within it.61 An idea does not become a
55 Id. at 819 (agreeing with Kaijala, that innovation in information science occurs though
sequential and cumulative improvements); see also Reichman, supra note 52 (considering
industrial design, an area where most innovation is of necessity incremental, to be the
archetypal legal hybrid).
56 See, .g., Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 3; Reichman and Samuelson, supra note 3;
Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value, supra note 4; Cynthia M. Bott, Protection of
Information Products: Balancing Commercial Reality and the Public Domain, 67 U. GIN. L.
REV. 237 (1998).
5 7 Reichman and Uhlir, supra note 3, at 808-09.
5 8 
'"[A]ccess' and 'accessibility' are used to refer to the public's ability to learn the ideas
and expression from a copyrighted work." Kreiss, supra note 44, at 10. Kreiss maintains that
the two conditions of access are that users of a work must be able to obtain a physical copy of
the work, and the ideas and expression must be available in human-understandable terms.
5 9 Litman, supra note 46, at 965; see also Kreiss, supra note 44, at 7 (maintaining that
access to new works, rather than the quantity of new works produced, is the essential goal of the
copyright system).
60 See, e.g., Hunsucker, supra note 15, at 705 (arguing that exclusive licensing
arrangements with sole source data producers should be deemed void against public policy).
61 Kenrick & Co. v. Lawrence & Co. (1890) 25 Q.B.D. 99; Donoghue v. Allied
Newspapers Ltd. (1937) Ch. 106. In the United States context, see Feist Publications, Inc. v.
Rural Telephone Service, 499 U.S. 340 (1991). Most commentators, such as Kreiss, maintain
that this rule exists so as to ensure a strong public domain. Kreiss, supra note 44. Thus, Kreiss
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"work!' (and thus qualify potentially for copyright protection) until it is reduced to
writing or some other material form.6 2 Until the idea is reduced to a material
form, it is free for anyone to use. Further, copyright exempts certain socially-
desirable uses from infringement.63
Databases and their protection have challenged this third assumption in at
least two ways. The first is that sui generis database protection models tend to be
based upon competition policy rather than promotion of cultural policies.64 Thus,
they do not necessarily place the same emphasis as copyright upon ensuring a
high degree of public access.6 5 The second challenge arises from the paradox of
new technologies. Just as these technologies facilitate piracy of existing
databases, they potentially provide database publishers with greater protection for
informational works than is available under copyright 66  Digital
telecommunications networks have enabled publishers to control the use of
information goods directly by contract, without having to rely upon the state to
correct market failure.67 These technologies allow electronic publishers to track
and charge consumers for every electronic access. On this basis, even browsing
sees the idea/expression dichotomy as ensuring that the public is supplied with diverse
expressions of the same ideas. But see Yen, supra note 45, at 538 (arguing that this is because
ideas are so incorporeal that the law cannot make them into property).
62 Section 102(a) of the U.S. Copyright Act provides that "[c]opyright protection subsists,
in accordance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device." Under the
Copyright Act, 1968 § 22.1. (Austl.), an idea becomes a work when it is "first reduced to
writing or some other material form.' Section 10.1 then defines "material form" as "any form
(whether visible or not) of storage from which the work or adaptation, or a substantial part of
the work or adaptation, can be reproduced," while "writing" is defined as "a mode of
representing or reproducing words, figures or symbols in a visible form.'
63 See supra note 49.
64 Reichman, supra note 52, at 2476. "Although the traditional justification for copyright
can provide a measure of support for copyright protection for online databases, this rationale
has been superseded in today's world of global trade by the fear of international trade sanctions
and loss in international competitiveness." Yastreboff, supra note 10.
65 See Yen, supra note 45, at 521 (arguing that copyright cannot be understood, nor
validly applied in terms of economic efficiency alone, but must be read with its natural law
origins in mind).
66 Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence ofSelf-Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L..
1089, 1090 (1998). This paradox is the "combination of promise and peril that make up the
digital dilenma." New technologies promise more access while imperiling one means of
incentive; they can improve access to information, but inhibit access in new ways; they promise
greater equality of access to information, but the potential to worsen the gap between the
information rich and the information poor. DIGrrAL DLEMMA, supra note 18, at xviii.
67 Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 3, at 796.
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and scientific uses, previously exempt under copyright laws, may incur charges. 68
For those that cannot pay the price, access can be denied. Thus, where such forms
of "self-help" are available,69 database owners may see the limits on information
ownership imposed by copyright as "optional restrictions" that can be avoided. 70
Thus, with regard to databases, digital technology challenges existing legal
structures in two opposing ways. Digital technologies aggravate market failure in
some cases, because they facilitate piracy. In other cases, they endow the
originator with abnormal market power.71
III. EXISTING MODELS OF PROTECTION ARE UNSATISFACTORY
A. Copyright Protection: Too Much Protection or Too Little?
Copyright protection is the traditional means of protecting databases.
Copyright establishes a surrogate form of ownership by erecting a system of
"portable fences." These fences, "valid against the world and backed by the
state," accompany creative effort in its "journey from mind to mind."72
For the purposes of copyright protection, databases are "compilations. '73
Compilations, like other works of "low authorial presence, ' 74 have been
68 Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 3, at 71.
69 Such forms of self help may also have privacy implications. These implications are
outside the scope of this paper. See Cohen, supra note 66, at 1108.
70 Id at 1090.
71 Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 3, at 65-66.
72 Reichman, supra note 19, at 820.
73 Section 101 of the U.S. Copyright Act defines a compilation as "a work formed by the
collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or
arranged in such a way that the resulting work as whole constitutes an original work of
authorship. The term 'compilation' includes collective works." Section 103 provides that the
subject matter specified in section 102 includes compilations and derivative works, but goes on
to specify that copyright in such a work "extends only to the material contributed by the author
of such a work and does not imply an exclusive right in the preexisting material."
Copyright Act, 1968 § 10.1 (Austl.) provides that a: 'Literary work' includes (a) a table,
or compilation, expressed in words, figures or symbols (whether or not in a visible form).'
Compilation is not defined. Given the classification of a compilation as a literary work, it would
seem that a compilation of artistic works does not fall within the protection of the Act. See A.
Monotti, The Extent of Copyright Protection for Compilations of Artistic Works, 15 EuR.
INTELL. PRoP. REv. 156 (1993).
74 For a comprehensive discussion of such works, see Ginsburg, Creation and
Commercial Value, supra note 4. Much "creative" effort protected by copyright is characterized
by a certain degree of personal expression that is absent in factual works such as compilations.
Reichman, supra note 19, at 799. This problem of low authorial presence is exacerbated in the
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protectable under copyright regimes75 since the earliest copyright acts.76 Despite
this history, works of low authorial presence are considered by many courts to be
problematic for modem copyright. Works of high authorial presence, such as
novels, are more readily associated with copyright protection.77 In the words of
one judge, copyright and factual compilations, in particular, are "uneasy
bedfellows.' q 8
Some commentators79 have suggested that this difficulty stems from a failure
to recognize the dual nature of copyright protection (that is, that copyright
protects both creativity and commercial value). Nevertheless, compilations, such
as databases, create at least two problems for the application of copyright
principles. The first problem relates to the grant of copyright itself. Although
compilations of information have been, since the inception of copyright
protectable, the facts within them have not.80 Facts and ideas have always been
considered common property.81 Some courts have seen this distinction as a
case of computerized databases by the fact that many electronic databases are either completely
computer-generated, or involve minimum human input. Yastreboff, supra note 10.
75 This history has been discussed by a number of commentators. See, e.g., Ginsburg,
Creation and Commercial Value, supra note 4; Robert A. Gorman, Copyright Protection for
the Collection and Representation of Facts, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1569 (1963); Robert C.
Denicola, Copyright in Collections ofFacts: A Theoryfor the Protection ofNon-fiction Literwy
Works, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 516 (1981). Compilations are guaranteed copyright protection by
the Beme Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 2, para. 5 (1987),
and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 10, para. 2
(1994) (hereinafter TRIPs). The latter expressly provides in art. 10, para. 2, that protection
should not extend to the data itself.
76 For instance, the Statute of Anne protected printed books of all types and the first U.S.
Copyright Act, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790), protected "maps, charts and books," informational
works of low authorial presence.
77 Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value, supra note 4, at 1882. This association can
be attributed to the rise of the Romantic notion of authorship as an expression of individuality.
78 Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 862 (2d Cir. 1984).
79 See, e.g., Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value, supra note 4, at 1870; Denicola,
supra note 75, at 516.
80 See, e.g., Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617 (1888) (holding that a volume of law
reports was capable of copyright protection, though the author had no exclusive right in the
judicial opinions published).
81 In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service, it was argued that no one might
claim originality in facts, because facts do not owe their origin to an original act of authorship.
499 U.S. 340, 357 (1991). The first person to find and report a particular fact has not created it,
but merely discovered its existence. A similar view of "fact discovery" was taken in BellSouth
Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley Information Publishing, 999 F.2d 1436, 1442
(11 th Cir. 1993). However, this notion of "fact discovery" has attracted some criticism from
commentators. See, e.g., Litman, supra note 46, at 996-97; Denicola, supra note 75, at 525;
Jane C. Ginsburg, Sabotaging and Reconstructing History: A Comment on the Scope of
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paradox.8 2 Courts have resolved this paradox in two ways. The first way is to
uphold copyright protection for "sweat of the brow," that is, the labor and
investment embodied in the compilation.8 3 The second way is to grant copyright
protection only for the creative aspects brought by the author to the work. In the
case of directories and other compilations, these creative aspects are the selection,
coordination, and arrangement of the contents of the compilation.84
1. Copyright Protection for "Sweat of the Brow"
"Sweat of the brow theory" is the basis for copyright protection of
compilations in the United Kingdom and Australia. Protection is extended to
original compilations. The standard of originality required is very low. Works
"originate" with the author and take some effort, judgment, or skill on his or her
part.85 The amount of effort, skill, or judgment required is a question of fact and
degree to be decided in the circumstances of each case.86 Merely making a list, or
putting lists together without some discrimination will not be sufficiently
Copyright Protection in Works of History after Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, 29 J.
COPYRIGHT Soc. 647,658 (1982).
82 Feist, 499 U.S. at 344; Financial Info., Inc. v. Moody's Investors Serv., Inc., 751 F.2d
501, 505 (2d Cir. 1984). Although note the statements by Lindley, L.J, in Lamb v. Evans
(1893) 1 Ch. 218, 223. His Honor did not seem to find this distinction problematic.
83 Waterlow Publishers Ltd. v. Rose (1990) 17 IP.R. 493; Scott v. Stanford L.R. 3 Eq.
718. United States cases upholding "sweat of the brow" include: Ill. Bell Tel. Co. v. Haines &
Co., 683 F. Supp. 1204 (N.D. Ill. 1988), affrd, 905 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1990); Jeweler's
Circular Pub. Co. v. Keystone Pub. Co., 281 F. 83 (2d Cir. 1922).
84 Feist, 499 U.S. at 340; Moody's, 808 F.2d at 204; Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736
F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1984); Worth v. Selchow & Righter Co., 827 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1987).
85 Kalamazoo (Aus) Pty. Ltd. v. Compact Bus. Sys. Pty. Ltd., (1985) 5 I.P.R. 213. Some
relatively recent United Kingdom decisions have suggested that it may not even be necessary to
show that skill has gone into a compilation. See Express Newspapers v. Liverpool Daily Post &
Echo (1985) F.S.R. 309 (where, in obiter, Justice Whitford said that there was a need for "skill
and labour, or possibly... only labour" in the production of factual works); see also Football
League v. Littlewoods Pools (1992) F.S.R. 409,415 (where the court considered that the earlier
case of Blacklock v. Pearson (1915) 2 Ch. 376, required only "painstaking hard work' to
establish copyright).
86 MacMillan v. Cooper (1923) 40 T.LR. 186; Udbroke (Football) Ltd. v. William Hill
(Football) Ltd. (1964) 1 W.L.R. 273.
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original.87 Material drawn from the common stock of knowledge may be
copyrighted, provided there is the necessary input of discrimination and effort 88
A substantial similarity between the copyright work and a subsequent work
will constitute infiingerent,89 unless the second work was independently
created,90 or a defense of fair dealing excuses that use.91 A second comer who
wishes to use a substantial part of a copyright compilation, and who is denied a
license by the copyright owner, must regenerate the information for himself or
herself.92 Most litigated cases have involved a factual scenario where the second
comer appropriated the original compilation for a competitive use.93 However,
such use is not necessary to succeed in an action for infringement.94
The "sweat of the brow" theory was applied in the database context in the
United Kingdom decisions of Waterlow Directories Ltd. v. Reed Information
Sevices Ltd.95 and Waterlow v. Rose.96
In Waterlow v. Reed, the plaintiff sought an interlocutory injunction to
restrain the defendant from infringing copyright in the "Solicitors' and Barristers'
Directory." The defendant published "Butterworth's Law Directory" and used
lists from the plaintiff's directory to contact lawyers and obtain information from
them to be included in its directory. Justice Aldous held that there had been a
copyright infringement because the defendant's work reproduced a substantial
part of the plaintiff's work.
On similar facts in Waterlow v. Rose, copyright infringement was again
made out. The plaintiff was entitled to copyright protection because of the effort
87 Cramp v. Smythson (1944) A.C. 329. In Cramp, where tables of information in a
pocket diary were held not to attract copyright, as there was no element of originality or skill in
the order in which the tables were arranged. They were merely "scraps of information." Id at
340.
88 Kalamazoo (Aus) Pty. Ltd. v. Compact Bus. Sys. Pty. Ltd. (1985) 5 I.P.R. 213.
89 Waterlow Publishers Ltd. v. Rose (1990) 17 I.P.R. 493.
90 Corelli v. Gray (1913) 29 T.L.R. 570.
91 See supra note 49.
92 In Waterlow Publishers Ltd. v. Rose, (1990) 17 I.P.IR 493, 505, Slade LJ. accepted that
Kelly v. Morris, (1866) L.IL 1 Eq. 697, and Morris v. Ashbee, (1868) L.R. 7 Eq. 34, established
the principle that verification of the information by a subsequent author will not necessarily
preclude a finding of infringement.
93 See, e.g., Waterlow Publishers Ltd. v. Rose (1990) 17 I.P.R. 493; Mander v. O'Brien
(1934) SA.S.R. 87; Longman v. Winchester X Ves. Jun. 272; Lamb v. Evans (1893) 1 Ch..
218; Matthewson v. Stockdale (1806) 12 Ves. Jun. 270.
94British Broad. Co. v. Wireless League Gazette Publ'g Co., (1926) 1 Ch. 433;
Weatherby v. Int'l Horse Agency, (1910) 2 Ch. 297.
95 (1990) 20 IP.R 69.
96 (1990) 17 I.P.R 493.
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expended in gathering and organizing the material. The court found that
databases, such as the directory in question, were intended to be used, as well as
read. Therefore, the court's focus was upon the issue of an implied license:97 what
sort of uses were licensed upon publication of the original work? Although
publication entitled others to use the work, it did not give a license to use the
compilation so as to create a competing work 98
B. Copyright Protection for Selection, Coordination, and Arrangement
In the United States prior to the decision in Feist, there were two lines of
authority governing the application of copyright to compilations. One line of
authority upheld protection on the basis of "sweat of the brow." The other line of
authority held that copyright in factual compilations would be awarded only to the
creative aspects of compilations: 99 that is, the creativity in selection, 100
arrangement, 01 and coordination of the factual contents. The decision in Feist
rejected the "sweat of the brow" theory.'02
97 A similar line of reasoning in the context of a perpetual common law copyright was
rejected in Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 657 (1834):
A book is valuable on account of the matter it contains, the ideas it communicates, the
instruction or entertainment it affords. Does the author hold a perpetual property in these? Is
there an implied contract by every purchaser of his book, that he may realise whatever
instruction or entertainment which the reading of it shall give, but shall not write out or print its
contents.
98 Waterlow v. Rose was referred to in the Canadian case of Tele-Direct (Publications),
Inc. v. American Business Information, Inc., where Tele-Direct published a yellow pages
directory. (1996) 35 I.P.R. 121. American Business Systems Inc. produced various business
information publications including business directories and CD-ROMs. These products gave
information about businesses, including telephone numbers. Justice McGillis said that
Waterlow stood for the proposition that "an important consideration in determining the question
of substantial similarity in relation to directories is whether the two works are in competition
with one another." Given that this was not the case on the facts before him, and given that the
plaintiff had merely acquired data not protected by copyright and sorted it according to criteria
which were common in the industry, His Honor refused to find copyright infringement.
9 9 Worth v. Selchow & Righter Co., 827 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1987); S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.
v. Associated Tel. Directory Publishers, 756 F.2d 801 (1 1th Cir. 1985); Eckes v. Card Prices
Update, 736 F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1984); Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365 (5th
Cir. 1981).
100 "Selection implies the exercise ofjudgment in choosing which facts from a given body
of data to include in a compilation." Key Publ'ns, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Pub. Enters., Inc.,
945 F.2d 509,513 (2d Cir. 1991).
101 Arrangement "refers to the ordering or grouping of data in to lists or categories that go
beyond the mere mechanical grouping of data as such, for example, the alphabetical,
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Like Waterlow, Feist involved a directory of information. In this case, the
subject matter in dispute was a typical white and yellow telephone directory,
published by Rural. Rural was a public utility that provided telephone service to
several communities in Kansas. Under state law, it was required to annually issue
an updated telephone directory. Rural obtained the data for its directory from its
subscribers, who provided the relevant information when applying for telephone
service from the company. The white pages of the directory listed in alphabetical
order the names, towns, and telephone numbers of the subscribers.
Feist was a publishing company that specialized in area-wide telephone
directories covering a wider geographical area than did Rural's directory. Feist
offered to pay Rural for the right to use its white pages listings. Rural declined to
license its listings to Feist. Feist then the used Rural's white pages listings without
Rural's consent Feist sought to obtain additional information, such as street
addresses, for the listings that it took from Rural's white pages. However, many
of the listings in Feist's directory were identical to listings in Rural's directory.
Rural brought an action for copyright infiingement. The Court held that the
listings in Rural's directory were uncopyrightable facts. Copyright could extend
only to the selection, coordination, or arrangement of the listings. However, these
were not sufficiently original to gain copyright protection. Rural's selection of
listings was "obvious" and its arrangement "inevitable." 103
Since Feist, there have been judicial attempts to restore copyright protection
for some factual compilations.104 Courts have been particularly ready to find
creativity in selection. Compilations will be copyrighted where a compiler makes
subjective, evaluative selections that are based on her personal knowledge and
experience, and are not inevitable or purely utilitarian.10 5 Courts in a number of
cases have made a distinction between ideas to which the merger doctrine106
chronological, or sequential listings of data."Key Publications, 945 F.2d at 513 (quoting
COPYRIGHT OFFICE GUIDELINES FOR REGISTRATION OF FACr-BASED COMPILATIONS (1989)).
102 See, e.g., Ill. Bell Tel. Co. v. Haines & Co., 905 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1990); Hutchinson
Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co. of Minn., 770 F.2d 128 (8th Cir. 1985).
103 Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340,362-63 (1991).
104 See Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1991); CCC Infor. Serv., Inc. v.
Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, 44 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1994).
105 See, e.g., Key Publ'ns, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ'g Enters., 945 F.2d 509 (2d Cir.
1991); Nester's Map & Guide Corp. v. Hagstrom Map Co., 796 F. Supp. 729 (E.D. N.Y. 1992);
CCC Info. Serv., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, 44 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1994); Lipton v.
Nature Co., 71 F.3d 464 (2d Cir. 1995); Budish v. Gordon, 784 F. Supp. 1320 (N.D. Ohio
1992).
106 This doctrine provides that, in some fact works, the expression available to a
subsequent author to express information already published by an originator will be very
limited. The idea and the expression then merge, so that an action for copyright infringement by
the originator will not be successful. In Kregos, the court said that in one sense, every
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should and should not apply. Those ideas that undertake to advance the
understanding of phenomena or the solution of problems, will succumb to the
merger doctrine. These facts or ideas are characterized as "building blocks of
understanding" or "hard ideas." Those ideas to which the merger doctrine should
not apply are those that are "infused with the author's taste or opinion." These are
"soft' ideas that do not materially assist the understanding of future thinkers. The
grant of copyright to "soft" ideas is seen to be less problematic for progress than
is a grant of copyright to "hard" ideas.
C. Criticisms of Copyright Protection
Neither copyright model is considered by commentators to be satisfactory for
the legal protection of databases. "Sweat of the brow" has been criticized for
giving too much protection to compilers. 10 7 The ready grant of copyright may
operate so as to give a de facto monopoly in the factual contents of a compilation.
Such a de facto monopoly may prevent compilers from building upon preexisting
compilations. "Sweat of the brow" does not provide incentive for creative, as
opposed to mere laborious, effort. Subsequent compilers are forced to collect raw
data anew. The doctrine encourages inefficiency (and could potentially drive up
costs to consumers) because compilers may expend considerable effort so as to be
assured of protection.108
"Sweat of the brow" can also be criticized for bestowing too lengthy a term
of protection upon databases.10 9 On the other hand, the principle in Feist has been
accused of leaving databases, electronic or non electronic, with minimal
protection. As one commentator has put it, Feist left databases "naked in the
compilation of facts represents a merger of an idea with its expression. 937 F.2d at 706.
Whether the idea will merge with expression depends upon the level of abstraction at which the
idea is identified. However, even if an idea is formulated at a relatively high level of abstraction,
merger may occur if the circumstances are such that the realistic availability of differing
expressions is so drastically limited that the idea can be said to have merged with the
expression. As long as selections of facts involve matters of taste and personal opinion, there is
no serious risk that withholding the merger doctrine would extend protection to an idea. In this
case, Kregos's pitching form was part way along the continuum spanning matters of pure taste
to matters of predictive analysis.
10 7 See generally Thorne, supra note 10; Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S.
340,354 (1991).
10 8 Polivy, supra note 51, at 20.
109 Yastreboff, supra note 10 "[Mjuch of the information currently available in online
databases is highly volatile. Therefore affording protection for a period of over 50 years... will
be excessive for most online databases, as the residual value of a database in that time will be
zero. This conflicts with the traditional justification of copyright." Id.
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market place," vulnerable to parasitic competitors, users, and information
Samaritans.110
The requirement in Feist of creativity as an aspect of originality has two
significant problems, one general and the other specific. Firstly, as Littrnan
argues, true originality in copyright is an illusion."' Authors do not create
something from nothing. Every act of authorship is a process of adaptation,
transformation, and recombination of existing material.1 12 If we really believed in
originality, we would require authors to prove which elements of a work were
really original, or require each author to seek permission from their
predecessors.113
The second problem is that the requirement of creativity is inappropriate in
the specific database context. The only scope for creativity, as Feist rightly
decided, is in selection and arrangement. Few compilations, however, will gain
copyright under such a test. Most arrangement systems for databases are
mundane. For instance, most directories are based on geographic area and are in
alphabetical order. Indeed, as one commentator has pointed out, if they were not
mundane, they would not be useful.11 4
A further problem with the requirement of "creative" arrangement is that
many electronic databases will not qualify for protection. This is because they
may be arranged or retrieved in variations limited only by the capabilities of the
computer and the sophistication of the retrieval program. There is no particular
"arrangement" to protect." 5 On the other hand, selection is an inadequate basis
110 Hunsucker, supra note 15, at 2. Since Feist, many compilations have been denied
protection. See generally Victor Lalli Enters., Inc. v. Big Red Apple, Inc., 936 F.2d 671 (2d Cir.
1991); Sem-Torq, Inc. v. K-Mart Corp., 936 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1991); BellSouth Adver. &
Publ'g Corp. v. Donnelly Info. Publ'g, Inc., 999 F.2d 1436 (1 th Cir. 1993); Mid-America Title
Co. v. Kirk, 59 F.3d 719 (7th Cir.); Skinder-Strauss Assoc. v. Mass. Continuing Legal Educ.,
Inc., 914 F. Supp. 665 (D. Mass. 1995); Am. Dental Ass'n v. Delta Plans Ass'n, 39 U.S.P.Q. 2d
1714 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Warren Publ'g, Inc. v. Microdos Data Corp., 115 F.3d 1509 (1 lth Cir.).
I 11 See Litman, supra note 46.
112 See also Yen, supra note 45, at 554.
113 Litman, supra note 46, at 1022.
114 Michael Schwartz, Copyright in Compilations of Facts: Feist Publications, Inc., v.
Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 5 EUt. INrELL PROP. REv. 178, 180 (1991); See, eg.,
BellSouth Adver. & Pub. Corp. v. Donnelly Info. Pub., Inc., 999 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1993)
(where the work in question was arranged in a way'typical" of business directories).
115 Denicola, supra note 75, at 531. Denicola goes on to note that even where arrangement
is sufficiently original, this aspect of the database is one that is rarely appropriated by second
comers. Id at 527-28. It is also the case that many electronic databases are computer-generated
or involve minimum human input. See generally Yastreboff, supra note 10.
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for protection of compilations because it cannot be applied to exhaustive
compilations.1 16
Thus, not only is the grant of copyright difficult to establish, but
infringement may be difficult to make out, short of wholesale appropriation. In
informational works, subsequent authors who wish to create a new work can
often choose only from a limited range of expression.117 Aware of this, courts
have either refused to find copyright infringement 1 8 or have held verbatim
reproduction, or very close paraphrasing is necessary to find infringement. 1 9
Thus, even where copyright is granted to a compilation, its protection tends to be
"thin."120
As noted above, some decisions since Feist have attempted to avoid this
problem by distinguishing between "hard facts" and "soft facts." These decisions,
however, have been criticized for their somewhat precarious logic.12 1 Perhaps the
most telling criticism of Feist is that some courts122 have reintroduced "sweat of
the brow" principles. One commentator observes that this "suggests a strong
judicial inclination to reward effort and give primacy to copyright's incentive
role."' 23
In practical terms, some database owners have added artificial "creative"
elements to the structure or content of their databases to satisfy the Feist test.124
116 -cks, supra note 11, at 1001. For examples of such comprehensive databases, see
Warren Publ'g, Inc. v. Microdos Data Corp., 115 F.3d 1509 (11th Cir. 1997); Am. Dental
Ass'n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass'n, 39 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1714 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
117 See statements made by Lindley, LJ., in Lamb v. Evans, (1893) 1 Ch. 218, 224
("There is so much common to [the plaintiff's] book and to other books of the same sort that
they very likely will contain the same information").
1 18 On the basis that idea and expression have merged and copyright does not protect
ideas.
119 BellSoth Adver. & Publ'g Corp., 999 F.2d at 1447; Harper House, Inc. v. Thomas
Nelson, Inc., 889 F.2d 197,205 (9th Cir. 1989).
120 Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 862 (2d Cir. 1984) ("The sweat of the
researcher's brow does not merit copyright protection absent, perhaps, wholesale
appropriation."); see also Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Sew,., 499 U.S. 340,349 (1991).
121 Ginsburg has asked. "Why should only subjective selections be protected while useful
but objective material not be protected? Even the distinction is debatable: there is much
subjectivity in even apparently objective presentations of facts; and subjective information is
easily objectified." Ginsberg, Protection of Databases, supra note 4, at 153. "Can infusions of
opinion make thin copyright fat again?" Id at 156.
122 U.S. Payphone, Inc. v. Executives Unlimited of Durham, Inc., 18 U.S.P.Q. 2d 2049
(4th Cir. 1991); Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd. v. Meredith Corp., 88 F3d 473 (7th Cir. 1996).
123 Polivy, supra note 51, at 45.
124 Jane C. Ginsburg, No "Sweat"? Copyright and Other Protection of Works of
Information, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 338, 347-49 (1992). Such added "creativity" may be by
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Database owners have also increased their reliance upon extra-copyright means of
protection. 125 This latter development has the potential to enable database owners
to override copyright principles altogether.
1. Extra-Copyright Protection: Legitimate Self-Help or Monopolization?
Copyright protection of databases may be supplemented or even replaced by
"self-help" forms of protection, such as contract126 and encryption.127
Commentators are divided as to the implications of such "extra-copyright"
protection. 128
Some commentators have considered such self-help measures to be
inadequate for the purposes of database protection. They raise a number of
concerns with regard to contractual protection: the level of control a database
maker can assert over the database contents may vary considerably; 129 because
the information does not reside physically with a database owner when it is
copied, the database owner does not know whether a contractual licensing
agreement is honored;130 contracts will only aid database owners where the
parties voluntarily abide by the contract terms, or if these terms are enforced by
the courts; 131 and contractual protection is available only as against the other
means of adding opinions, abstracts or other non fact specific information. Sanks, supra note 5,
at 1009. Apart from the fact that such embellishments may frustrate users and increase costs,
this creativity may be too trivial to give rise to copyright protection. See Matthew Bender & Co.
v. West Publ'g Co., 158 F.3d 674 (2d Cir. 1998).
125 Sanks, supra note 5, at 1008.
126 Such as "shrinkwrap" and "click-on" licenses; or providing access on a price tier
method by providing a password with which to access the data. Id. at 1009.
127 U.S. CoPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 31, at 19.
12 8 DiGrrAL DILEMMA, supra note 18, at xxdii (describing licensing and encryption in the
digital environment as potentially a "two-edged sword," creating unprecedented opportunities
for individuals to access information in new and better ways, but also potentially having a
significant impact on public access).
129 The amount of protection a database maker will have depends upon whether the data is
freely available in the public domain and whether she or he chooses to make the database
publicly available or retain private control over it. Hunsucker, supra note 15, at 717.
130 See Sanks, supra note 5, at 1008.
131 See Hunsucker, supra note 15, at 719; see also ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d
1447, 1453-55 (7th Cir. 1996). In this case, ProCD developed a database of telephone listings,
which it sold on CD-ROM. Zeidenberg bought the CD and incorporated it into his own
database, and then made this database available for free over the interet. Zeidenberg argued
that copyright law preempted the 'shrinkwrap' licensing agreement on the product. However,
the court found the license to be valid and enforceable. But f. Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software,
Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 269 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that a shrinkwrap license for computer
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contracting party. In order to fill in the gaps in protection, a database owner must
couple contractual protection with technological means of protection in order to
reduce the vulnerability of databases.132 However, commentators point out that
technological methods such as encryption also have limitations: technological
protection is not sufficiently advanced to be relied upon;133 these methods cannot
protect a database once it is printed; and the necessity for technological solutions
could increase database costs. 134
Others, however, consider that these extra copyright forms of protection give
database owners too much power. They argue that these forms of protection could
potentially disrupt the public-access/private-incentive equilibrium so important to
copyright regimes. Such commentators have pointed to the already monopolistic
nature of the database industry,135 and argue that this may be reinforced by the
use of contracts.136 In the case of databases where public access is restricted,
137
the growing capacity to track and charge for each use of on-line data has
particular implications. Publishers can effectively be their own collection
societies, and operate free of any external regulation.138 They may charge others
for uses that would be permitted under copyright such as browsing or using the
information for research. Those charges may be sustainable if there is sufficient
competition,139 but given the monopolistic nature of the database industry, this
seems unlikely. This could have repercussions for science and research. As data
diskettes containing a software program that prohibited unauthorized duplication of the
programs was an unenforceable contract of adhesion).
132 Hunsucker, supra note 15, at 708-10.
133 DIGrrLDIEM~MA, supra note 18, at xxvi (observing that technical protection tools are
not widely used for IP protection in 1999, although a few tools have been deployed to protect
intellectual property in certain niches with some success. Such tools are "useful but not a
panacea").
134 Sanks, supra note 5, at 1009.
135 Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 3, at 70 (observing that the private database
industry is largely characterized by niche marketers who dominate specific market segments).
This monopolistic nature of the database industry may be attributed to a number of factors:
startup costs are relatively high, the prospects for market-sharing are not often realized, much
data is unavailable from public sources and the creation of a single complex database
apparently constitutes a de facto barrier to entry by competitors that is seldom overcome. Id. at
94. But cf Hunsucker, supra note 15, at 778 (arguing that this may only be true of markets
dominated by database makers who are also the sole source for the data sought).
13 6 Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 3, at 70.
137 See Hunsucker, supra note 15, at 713.
13 8 Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 3, at 806.
13 9 Hunsucker, supra note 15, at 718 (arguing that the potential for monopolistic control is
lessened by market competition, and if database makers make their product available only
through telecommunications devices their market share will necessarily be reduced to those
who have access to such devices).
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may no longer enter the public domain, researchers could be forced to obtain new
grants or substitute funding to repeat the collection process. Thus, scarce funds
would be used to duplicate the creation of knowledge already in existence.140 In
short, Reichman argues that noncopyrightable information could become the
object of contractual overprotection. This overprotection is, in the long run,
potentially more insidious than the chronic underprotection that results from the
decision in Feist.141
2. Unfair Competition Laws: Uncertain Protection
Databases may also receive protection under unfair competition laws. A
doctrine of unfair competition or misappropriation has been defined as "a right
against imitation, not requiring misrepresentation, of valuable intangibles,"
"valuable intangibles" being further defined as "an aspect of a plaintiff's person,
product or business." 142
The development of such a regime, particularly for "legal hybrids," such as
designs and electronic informational goods, has been advocated by a number of
commentators.143 The advantage of an unfair competition regime is that it focuses
140 Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 3, at 808-09.
141 Reichman, supra note 19,827-28.
142 Michael Spence, Passing Off and the Misappropriation of Valuable Intangibles, 112
L.Q.R. 472,476 (1996). The doctrine was applied in International News Sertdce v. Associated
Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918), where the parties were competitors in the gathering and distribution
of news and its publication for profit in newspapers throughout the United States. The plaintiffs
were members of the Associated Press, a cooperative organization that gathered news for the
benefit of its membership. International News Service pirated the organization's news by, inter
alia, copying news from bulletin boards and early editions of members' newspapers and selling
this to the defendant's customers. The Court found that this practice amounted to unfair
competition. News, as between rival news gathering and publishing agencies, was regarded as
quasi-property.
The defendant in appropriating it and selling it as its own, is endeavouring to reap where it has
not sown, and by disposing of it to newspapers that are competitors of complainant's members,
is appropriating to itself the harvest of those who have not sown. Stripped of all disguises, the
process amounts to an unauthorised interference with the normal operation of complainant's
legitimate business precisely at the point where the profit is to be reaped in order to divert a
material portion of the profit from those who have earned it to those who have not, with special
advantage to defendant in the competition because of the fact that it is not burdened with any
part of the expense of gathering news. The transaction speaks for itself, and a court of equity
ought not to hesitate long in characterising it as unfhir competition in business.
Id at221.
143 See, e.g., Dennis S. Kaijala, Misappropriation as a Third Intellectual Property
Paraigm, 94 COLiM. L. REV. 2594 (1994). See generally ANSELM KAMPERMAN SANDERS,
UNFAIR COMPETmON LAW: THE PROTECrION OF INTELLECIUAL AND INDUSTRiAL CREAnTVrY
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upon the methods of copying, rather than the nature of the work copied. Some
commentators have suggested that unfair competition is the appropriate basis for
database protection. 44 Others have argued that the potential for database
protection under "hot news" misappropriation145 and contract means that sui
generis database protection is unnecessary.' 46
However, such a regime faces some practical difficulties for database
protection. In some jurisdictions, such as Australia, a common law doctrine of
unfair competition has not been judicially accepted.147 This is despite expressions
of the need for such a doctrine.148 In other jurisdictions,149 such as the United
Kingdom, there have been some judicial attempts to extend passing off to provide
a remedy for unfair competition. o50 To date, however, misrepresentation, rather
than misappropriation, remains the core of such an action.15 1
(1997); Gordon, supra note 42; S. Ricketson, Reaping without Sowing; Unfair Competition and
Intellectual Property Rights in Anglo-Australian Law, 7 UNSW LJ. 1 (1984); J. Lahore,
Designs and Petty Patents: A BroaderReform Issue, 7 AUSTL INTELL. PROP. J. 7 (1996).
144 Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 3.
145 See Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1997) (where
NBA sued Motorola for providing real-time information about NBA games to consumers
through a hand-held pager). The NBA claimed under various heads of action, including unfair
competition by misappropriation. However, the court found NBA did not have a cause of action
because it did not show a sufficient competitive effect on the market for its products. Protection
would not be preempted where (i) a plaintiff generates or gathers information at a cost; (ii) the
information is time sensitive; (iii) a defendant's use of the information constitutes free riding on
the plaintiff's efforts; (iv) the defendant is in direct competition with a product or service
offered by the plaintiffs; and (v) the ability of other parties to free ride on the efforts of the
plaintiff or others would so reduce the incentive to produce the product or service that its
existence or quality would be substantially threatened. See also Shane M. McGee, Cooling off
the Hot-news Exception: National Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019
(1998).
146 Ginsburg Protection of Databases, supra note 4, at 174.
147 Victoria Park Racing & Recreation Grounds v. Taylor, 58 C.L.R. 479 (1937); see also
Moorgate Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. Philip Morris Ltd. (No. 2), 156 C.L.R. 414 (1984).
148 See, e.g., Hexagon Pty. Ltd. v. Austl. Broad. Comm'n, 7 A.L.R. 233 (1975); Willard
King Org. Pty. Ltd. v. United Telecasters Sydney Ltd., 2 N.S.W.L.R. 547 (1981).
149 The unfair competition law of member states of the European Union is seen as too
varied and fragmentary for the European Commission to have relied solely on harmonizing
such principles for the purposes of database protection. Penelope Pearce, Directories to
Databases: Bringing the Law into the Information Age, 2 L. TaaH. J. (June 1993),
www.law.warwick.ac.uk/ltj/2-2b.html.
150 See, e.g., J. Bollinger v. Costa Brava Wine Co. Ltd. (1960) Ch. 262; John Walker &
Sons Ltd. v. Henry Ost & Co. Ltd. (1970) 1 W.L.R. 917; Wamink Bestolen Venootschap v. 3.
Townsend & Sons (Hull) Ltd. (1979) A.C. 731.
151 For an argument justifying the retention of the doctrine of passing off in its current
nor, see Spence, supra note 140, at 472.
2001]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
In the United States, unfair competition protection is notoriously
unreliable.' 52 Although the court in Feist suggested unfair competition law may
be applicable, the doctrine may be preempted by the federal Copyright Act under
the doctrine of federal supremacy.153 Further, unfair competition does not protect
database makers from information Samaritans.154
Given the shortcomings of common law unfair competition, it may be
desirable to develop a statutory unfair competition regime for database protection.
Indeed, one of the more recent US sui generis database proposals 155 uses unfair
competition as the basis of protection. This brings me to the issues surrounding
sui generis protection.
3. Sui Generis Protection: Monopoly in Information?
In 1992, the European Commission proposed to harmonize national laws
within the European Union regarding the protection of databases.156 This
proposal was adopted in a modified form as a directive 157 to member states in
1996,158 and took effect on January 1, 1998.159 The EU Directive was the result
of a number of factors, including the desire to increase investment in databases
within the European Union states.160 The original proposal was relatively
innocuous and based upon unfair competition principles. 161 However, the final
152 Hunsucker, supra note 15, at 16.
153 See Schwartz, supra note 112, at 178.
154 See Hunsucker, supra note 15, at 16.
155 See H.R. 1858, 106th Cong. (1999).
156 While harmonization of EU law is given as an important motive for the database
directive, this claim has met with some skepticism. See, ag., Reichman & Samuelson, supra
note 3, at 99.
1571Te EU establishes a single, integrated market, encouraging the free movement of
goods through common economic and legal policies. A directive is a secondary community law
that binds member states but requires implementation by the enactment of domestic laws in
each member state within a specified time. Sanks, supra note 5, at 996
158 Council Directive No 96/9, LJL 77/20 (1996).
159 Comparable database protection laws, as required by the EU Directive, have been
enacted by Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Spain, and
Sweden. Julius . Marke, Database Protection Bills Pending in Congress, N.Y. LJ., Aug. 17,
1999, at 5.
160 See Recital 11, Council Directive NO 96/9, LJL 77/20 (1996) (noting the imbalance in
the level of investment in the database sector).
161 Originally, the Directive was based upon the Nordic Catalogue Rule, which gives
short term copyright protection for compilations that fail to satisfy the requirements of
copyright law. It prevents slavish reproduction of all or part of the original work for a period of
ten years from the date of first publication. See Reichman, supra note 19, at 828.
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proposal, which confers copyright-like protection, 162 has proved to be more
controversial. 63
Subsequent to the EU Directive, there were two other important sui generis
proposals. In 1996, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)164
proposed a treaty on the subject of legal protection of databases. 165 In the United
States, H.R. 3531 attempted to provide strong database protection.' 66 However,
H.R 3531 and successive attempts to introduce database legislation have been, to
date, unsuccessful. 167
The EU Directive has proved to be an extreme form of sui generis protection.
Database is defined in article 1(2) as "a collection of independent works, data or
other materials arranged in a systematic or methodical way capable of being
individually accessed by any means." The Directive seeks to protect the
"substantial investment" embodied in a database. 168
Despite the fact that "substantial investmenf' is open to interpretation, the
grant of protection is similar to copyright protection under the "sweat of the
brow" model. However, the EU Directive proposes much stronger protection than
was granted under copyright.
162 Sanks, supra note 5, at 993.
163 The EU Directive actually establishes a dual system of protection, composed of
copyright for the structure of databases, well as the sui generis protection.
164 The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) is a specialized United Nations
coordinating body for international patents, trademarks, and copyrights.
165 In December 1996, representatives from over 180 countries met to negotiate three new
international copyright protection treaties that addressed advances in technology. One of the
proposals originally scheduled for negotiation was the Basic Proposal for the Substantive
Provisions of the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Databases, WIPO CRNR/DC/6,
August 30, 1996. Negotiations on this proposal were delayed until later in 1997. At its
Governing Bodies meeting on March 20 and 21, 1997, WIPO convened a "committee of
experts" which met September 10-12, 1997 to consider a draft of a "Treaty on Intellectual
Property in Respect of Databases." The treaty has proved controversial. More recently, WIPO
published a nine-point 'Digital Agenda" highlighting the steps it plans to take to ensure that all
countries are involved in the process of defining policy and addressing the issues surrounding
intellectual property law in the digital age. One of these steps is working on a database
protection treaty.
166 The Database Investment and Intellectual Property Antipiracy Act, H.R. 3531, 104th
Cong. (1996) (introduced byRep. Carlos Moorhead).
167 In 1997, Congressman Howard Coble introduced HKR 2652, Collections of
Information Antipiracy Act; and in the last Congress, two competing bills, H.R. 354, and H.R.
1858 were proposed.
168 EU Directive article 7(1) confers a right upon the maker of a database that can show
"there has been qualitatively and/or quantitatively a substantial investment in either the
obtaining, verification or presentation of the contents.'
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Unlike copyright the grant of protection under the Directive is potentially
perpetual. The database holder has fifteen years protection under article 10(1).
However, any "substantial change" of either a qualitative or quantitative nature-
and small changes may be cumulative for this purpose-that result in the database
being considered a substantial new investment will qualify the database for a
further fifteen year protection period under article 10(3).
Unlike copyright the scope of protection in databases is very wide. Article
7(1) of the Directive grants the database owner the "right to prevent extraction
and/or reutilization of the whole or of a substantial part, evaluated qualitatively
and/or quantitatively, of the contents of that database." "Extraction" is defined as
"the permanent or temporary transfer of all or a substantial part of the contents of
a database" to another medium by any means or form. Thus, even temporary
transfers to online receivers would be caught by this provision.169 The EU
Directive defines "reutilization" in article 7(2)(b) as "any form of making
available to the public all or a substantial part of the contents of a database by the
distribution of copies, by renting, by online, or other forms of transmission." This
would cover online use or transmissions of data, including those in value added or
derivative formats. 170
Unlike copyright fair use provisions are circumscribed. Under the EU
Directive, the use of an "insubstantial parf' of the database is permitted by article
8(1) and any contractual provision to the contrary is rendered "null and void" by
article 15. Article 9 of the EU Directive also allows member states to legislate for
exceptions for certain uses in three categories: extraction for private purposes of
the contents of a non-electronic database; extraction for the purposes of
illustration for teaching or scientific research, as long as the source is indicated
and to the extent that this extraction is justified to achieve the purpose; and
extraction and/or reutilization for the purposes of public security or an
administrative or judicial procedure article 9. These exceptions, however, are to
be read in conjunction with the provisions relating to the obligations of lawful
users of publicly available databases. Under articles 8(2) and 8(3), these
obligations prohibit acts that: conflict with "the normal exploitation of the
database"; or "unreasonably" prejudice the "legitimate interests of the database
maker"; 171 or cause "prejudice to the holder of a copyright or related right in
respect of the works or subject matter contained in the database."
169 Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 3, at 87.
170 Id
171 Recital 50 provides that these articles function as a limitation on the exceptions in
article 9.
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The EU's protection,172 under article 11, is afforded only to developers
whose countries provide similar reciprocal rights to databases developed by EU
citizens and companies. This poses difficulties to the international community,
particularly the U.S. If a country outside the EU fails to enact sui generis
protection, its database producers will be unable to enjoy the protection offered by
the EU Directive. European companies that can avail themselves of the Directive
will then be in a better competitive position.173
C. Criticisms of the Sui Generis Models
The EU Directive and the corresponding WIPO and United States proposals
have attracted some criticism. Reichman and Samuelson argue that these forms of
sui generis database protection are "the most deviant" example of sui generis
protection demanded by the breakdown of the traditional copyright/patent
dichotomized model of intellectual property. 174 In particular, they make the
following criticisms: the proposed sui generis models would confer a far stronger
monopoly than is necessary to avert market failure; they would create an
exclusive property rights regime of potentially unlimited duration that would be
subject to few, if any, public policy limitations; they would jeopardize basic
'scientific research, eliminate competition in the markets for value added products
and services; and convert existing barriers to entry into insuperable legal barriers
to entry;175 there is little guidance as to what constitutes an "insubstantial" part of
a database; the provisions allowing for traditional "fair uses" are far more
restricted than under copyright;176 and these models could potentially lead to
relatively high prices for the use of public goods.' 77
172 The EU Directive is not only applicable to member states. It must also be implemented
in the additional states of the European Economic Area-Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway;,
and Central and Eastern European States have also agreed to provide for an equivalent level of
protection by December 31, 1999. Thomas Hoeren, EU Leads World Towards Database
Protection, IP WORLDWIDE, Aug. 1997.
173 Hoeren, supra note 170.
174 Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 3, at 53.
175 Id. at 55.
176 Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 3, at 810.
177 See Hoeren, supra note 162 (considering such arguments essentially as "scare
tactics"). He argues that such criticisms are merely a matter of US national pride in response to
the EU Directive:
The US is notorious for aggressively using the threat of trade sanctions to pressure other
countries to increase their IP protections and to open their markets to American IP products. The
US should not be surprised that a similar strategy is being used by the EU to induce other
countries to provide greater protection for databases.
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The more recent United States proposals seem to have taken such criticisms
on board. In particular, H.R. 1858 seeks to adopt an unfair competition approach
to database protection. However, it has been criticized because it vests legal
authority in the Federal Trade Commission to prevent database piracy, rather than
the plaintiffs themselves. 178 H.R. 354, a modified version179 of the earlier United
States proposals, H.R. 3531 and H.R. 2652, has also met with opposition. Its
critics argue that it will interfere with the free flow of information;1 80 facilitate
non-competitive pricing for access to facts that rightly belong in the public
domain; 181 and provide potentially perpetual protection.182
In summary, then, the "Goldilocks" answer to database protection, that is,
protection that is not too strong and not too weak, but 'just right," has proved
Id. But see DIGrrAL DILEMMA, supra note 18, at xxiv (where the report notes the potential, with
the increasing commercialization of federal government information, for limitations upon the
amounts of information that can be accessed inexpensively by the public).
17 8 Reed-Elsevier, Inc. Senior Vice President and General Counsel Henry Horbaczewski,
for the Coalition Against Database Piracy described the bill as "deeply flawed" and argued that
it prevents plaintiffs from taking appropriate legal action against suspected pirates. NEVSBYrEs,
Nov. 17, 1999.
17 9 H.R. 354 is nearly identical to H.R. 2652 of the 105th Congress, defeated in the Senate
because of it lack of "fair use' exceptions for database users. H.R. 354 adds fair use measures
for scientific, education, and research purposes, provided such use does not directly harm the
actual market for the database.
180 "Many universities, library associations and telecoms are fearful that a measure with
tougher enforcement such as H.R. 354 would be too restrictive on the free flow of information
and place too much information in the hands of a few select companies." House of
Representatives Wrestles with Two Database Protection Measures, SIMBA REP. DIRECrORY
PUBL'G, Sept. 15, 1999. "The library conmunity is concerned that H.R. 354 is overly broad in
scope and represents a radical departure from the current intellectual property framework,
which protects expression and not investment." The libraries are also concerned about the
vagueness of key terms, arguing that the proposal 'would permit costly litigation against
academics who would be forced to raise the imprecise defense after the suit had begun of what
may constitute harm to the actual or potential market. Marke, supra note 157.
181 Washington Senior Counsel, Sally Greenberg for the Consumers Union, reported in
NEWSBYrES, Nov. 17, 1999; CoMM. DAILY, Nov. 18, 1999. "Of equal concern are the
provisions of H.R. 354 which allow a producer unprecedented control over uses of a database
including downstream, transformative use of facts and government works." Database
Protection Bills Pending in Congress, N.Y. LJ., Aug. 17, 1999. Firms that have lobbied against
H.R. 354 include the United States Chamber of Commerce, the American Library Association,
AT&T, Schwab, DLldirect, Bloomberg, and Sun Microsystems. Mark Hendrickson, Coble Bill
Blocked SA joins Schwab, DLJdirect in Opposition, SEC. INDUSTRY NEWS, Nov. 22, 1999. The
article also reports on the 'Dear Colleague!' letter signed jointly by two key members of the
Commerce Committee, John Dingell and Michael Oxley, arguing that the Coble Bill would
create "a quasi-property right in facts themselves, granting the compiler of information an
unprecedented right to control value-added, downstream uses of the resulting collection."
182 See generally Marke, supra note 157.
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extremely elusive. Copyright protection for arrangement and selection does not
provide adequate protection against free riding. Copyright protection under
"sweat of the brow" may provide too much protection. Extra copyright protection,
either as a supplement or replacement for copyright, may overprotect or
underprotect databases. Overprotection may occur so that the public is denied
access for scientific, educational, or reporting purposes, and subsequent compilers
cannot recreate databases. 183 Alternatively, extra-copyright protection may
provide too little protection, particularly where the wrongdoer is not in a
contractual relationship with the database owner. The application of unfair
competition laws tends to be uncertain. Finally, most of the sui generis models to
date may amount in practical terms to a grant of private ownership in individual
facts. If we accept copyright's premise, a grant of a monopoly right cannot be
justified unless the quid pro quo of public access is granted.184 Most sui generis
schemes, however, grant potentially perpetual protection and restrict the uses that
can be made by both researchers and potential competitors. Such schemes seem
difficult to defend in terms of social benefits. Although supporters of such
schemes generally argue that the public good is served by the creation of more
databases, this argument tends to be flawed. As Kreiss points out, such systems
may create more works, but unless public access is assured, there will be less
social benefit in terms of knowledge and progress.185
I turn now to a consideration of premodern copyright cases. My claim is that
these cases potentially provide an alternative model for database protection.
183 Dee Ann Divis, Database Legislation that Bites, GEO INFO. SYs., May 1998:
Data may be too expensive to generate twice or may be historical and cannot be recreated.
Environmental and remote sensing imagery is a good example of the latter problem. Samples or
pictures are taken at a particular time; there is no way to go back and get original data from a
year ago.
As discussed below in regard to the sui generis schemes, Kreiss argues that such denial of
access disrupts the quid pro quo established by copyright. Kreiss, supra note 44, at 56.
184 Kreiss, supra note 44.
185 Kreiss, supra note 44, at 29 (arguing "if an author refuses to create a work because the
incentive is not large enough, then the work will not be created. Complaining that the incentive
is not large enough is not a reason for society to change the system for that author or group of
authors!"). Id at 31.
2001)
OHIO STATE LAWJOURAL
IV. PREMODERN COPYRIGHT CASES PROVIDE AN EFFECTIVE MODEL
FOR DATABASE PROTECTION
A. Use of the Term "Premodern"
The term "premoder" refers to the period from the late eighteenth century to
the 1850s. I have borrowed the term from The Making of Modern Intellectual
Property Law by Brad Sherman and Lionel Bently.186 In this book, the authors
divide intellectual property law into the premodern and the modem. They argue
that by around the 1850s, intellectual property law had developed its own logic
and grammar. This period, therefore, is roughly the dividing line between the
premodern and the modem. The authors acknowledge that this dividing line
cannot be drawn with precision. 187 With this in mind, I will primarily be
considering cases up to the 1850s. Some later cases that exhibit the principles of
the premodem, however, will also be referenced. For my analysis, I shall refer to
cases from both Great Britain and America. The reasoning is similar in both
jurisdictions, and the judges in these cases often refer to cases from the
neighboring jurisdiction.
Sherman and Bently argue that premodem intellectual property law had
certain characteristics. Premodern law was not divided into our now-familiar
categories-copyright, patent designs, trademarks-but was subject specific and
reactive.188 The particular concern of premodern intellectual property law was
with the mental or creative labor embodied in the protected subject matter. It
employed the language, concepts and questions of classical jurisprudence. These
characteristics may be contrasted with modem intellectual property law. Modem
intellectual property law is careful to police the boundaries between intellectual
property regimes. It tends to be more abstract and forward-looking than
premodem law. Its focus is not on the labor embodied in the object but on the
object in its own right. Rather than employing the ideas of classical jurisprudence,
it uses the resources of political economy and utilitarianism.
The characteristics of the premodem period-in particular its subject specific
nature, its fluidity, and its interest in mental labor-make it interesting and
relevant to the database debate.
186 Sherman & Bently, supra note 23.
187 Idr at 3 (acknowledging that this is not a perfect divide, but serves as "a useful basis"
from which to explore and understand intellectual property law).
188 During the premodem period, the categories of copyright, patent, and design were not
clearly delineated. Thus, judges often speak of the "copyright' in an invention, or use the
analogy of machinery to illustrate copyright principles. See, ag., Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S.
591 (1834); Storyv. Holcombe, 23 F. Cas. 171, 173 (C.C.D. Ohio 1847) (No. 13,497); Greene
v. Bishop, 10 F. Cas. 1128, 1134 (C.C.D. Mass. 1858) (No. 5,763).
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B. The Subject Matter of Early Copyright Cases and the Grant of
Protection
Informational works of low authorial presence, including compilations, were
a common subject of copyright 189 disputes in pre-modern cases. 190 Premodem
copyright cases granted protection readily to such works. In order to confer
copyright protection, courts demanded that two criteria be satisfied. The first was
that a work had to be original, in the sense that something new was brought into
existence. 191 The second criteria was that the work be the result of "mental
labor."1 9 2
189 The Statute of Anme, (1710) 8 Anne, ch. 19, granted authors copyright in their works
for up to twenty-eight years. The Act was entitled "An act for the encouragement of learning,
by vesting the copies of printed books in the authors or purchasers of such copies, during the
times therein mentioned." A number of early cases argued the issue as to whether common law
copyright existed. Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303 (1769); 98 Eng. Rep. 201, found in favor of a
perpetual, post-publication common law copyright, but was overruled in Donaldson v. Beckett,
98 Eng. Rep. 257 (1774). Although the decision in the latter case was that post-publication
copyright depended solely upon the Statute of Anne, there were still varying views on the
matter expressed by the courts for some years. See, ag., Jefferys v. Boosey, 4 H.L.C. 815
(1854); 10 Eng. Rep. 681. In the United States, the matter was debated at some length in
Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591 (1834).
190 Saunders v. Smith, 3 Mylne & C 711; 40 Eng. Rep. 1100 (1838); Wheaton v. Peters,
33 U.S. 591 (1834) (compilations of law reports); Wilkins v. Aikin, 17 Ves. Jun. 422; 34 Eng.
Rep. 163 (1810) (a book on Greek antiquities); Mawman v. Tegg, 2 Russ. 385; 38 Eng. Rep.
380 (1826) (an encyclopaedia); Roworth v. Wilkes, 1 Camp. 94; 170 Eng. Rep. 889 (1807) (a
book on broadsword techniques); Lewis v. Chapman, 3 Beav. 132; 49 Eng. Rep. 152 (1840)
(topographical dictionary); Gyles v. Wilcox, 2 Atk. 141; 26 Eng. Rep. 489 (1740) (alleged
infringement of SIR MATrHEW HALE'S PLEAS OF THE CROWN); Cary v. Kearsley, 4 Esp. 168,
170 Eng. Rep. 679 (1802); Cary v. Longman & Rees 1 East 358; 102 Eng. Rep. 138 (road
directory); Bartlett v. Crittendon 2 F. Cas. 967 (C.C.D. Ohio 1849) (No. 1,076) (manuscript on
bookkeeping); Bramwell v. Halcomb, 3 My & Cr 737 (1836) (treatise on the MANNER OF
PROCEEDING ON BILLS IN THE HousE OF COMMONS).
191 That is, reduced to a material form: "The idea when once reduced to writing, is
susceptible of identity, and becomes the subject of property." Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591,
677 (Thompson, J., dissenting). In the specific context of a compilation, it was said in Story v.
Halcomb 23 F. Cas. 171, 174 (C.C.D. Ohio 1847) (No. 13,497), that:
To compile is to copy from various authors into one work. In this the judgment may be said to
be exercised to some extent in selecting and combining the extracts. Such a work entitles the
compiler... to a right of property. This right may be compared to that of a patentee, who, by a
combination of known mechanical structures, has produced anew result.
Although the individual works could be copied, the originality requirement was that the work as
a whole should exist for the first time, that is, not be copied from an existing work. Longman v.
Winchester, 16 Ves. 269; Eng. Rep. 987 (1809).
192 See infra text accompanying note 194.
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These two requirements are illustrated in Gray v. Russell.193 In this case, the
plaintiff alleged the defendant had infringed copyright in his Latin Grammar. The
defendant argued that there was nothing substantially new in the notes to the
plaintiff's text All the notes in substance, and many in form, could be found in
antecedent works. Justice Story said, however, that this was not the "true
question" before the court:
The tre question is, whether these notes are to be found collected and embodied in
any former single work. It is admitted that they are not so found. The most, that is
contended for, is, that [the plaintiff] has selected his notes from very various authors,
who have written at different periods, and that any other person might, by a diligent
examination of the same works, have made a similar selection. ... Now, certainly, the
preparation and collection of these notes from these various sources, must have been
the a work of no small labor, and intellectual exertion. The plan, the arrangement, and
the combination of these notes in the form, in which they are collectively exhibited in
Gould's Grammar, belong exclusively to this gentleman. 194
Unlike Feist, the courts did not require an additional element of "creativity."
There were at least three reasons for imposing such a low threshold test for
the grant of protection: the first rationale was the clear understanding that no work
of authorship is truly original. Any attempt to protect "real" originality would
mean that virtually no works in literature, science or art, would qualify for
protection. 195
This did not mean, however, that an author had a monopoly over the
information contained in such a work This was made clear in Emerson v.
Davies,196 where the court said that an author had no right to appropriate to
himself the materials that were common to all persons before he made the work.
193 10 F. Cas. 1035 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 5,728).
194 Gray v. Russell, 10 F. Cas. 1035, 1037 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 5,728).
195 See, e.g., Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615,619 (C.C.D. 1845) (No. 4,436):
No man writes exclusively from his own thoughts, unaided and uninstructed by the thoughts of
others. The thoughts of every man are, more or less, a combination of what other men have
thought and expressed, although they may be modified, exalted or improved by his own genius
or reflection.
See also Litman, supra note 46. The argument as to originality of factual works was also put
forward by counsel in Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591 (1834):
As to the objection that the matter of which the report is composed is not original; we answer
this is wholly unnecessary in copyright. There is no analogy in that respect between copyrights
and patents. A man who makes an Encyclopedia may have a copyright, although he does not
write a word of it.
Ultimately, the point was not decided in this case.
196 8 F. Cas. 615,619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436).
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Conversely, however, subsequent authors had no right to appropriate the author's
labor or creativity. Such authors could not take the originator's materials with his
"improvements superadded, whether they consist in plan, arrangement or
illustrations, or combinations; for these are strictly his own."197
The second rationale for this relatively easy grant of copyright is the
importance that the courts placed generally upon informational works.198 As was
observed in Jefferys v. Boosey,199 access to published works was an important
social good. Learning was best encouraged by ensuring that learners had free
access to the "advances in literature and science to be found in useful books. '200
While mindful of the need to retain ideas and facts as "common property," the
denial of protection to informational works was a result the courts wished to
avoid. This view can be seen in Lewis v. Fullarton.20 1 In this case, the plaintiff
sought an injunction against alleged copyright infringement of his book, The
Topographical Dictionary of England. The court granted the injunction. It found
that a considerable amount of the defendant's book had simply been copied from
the plaintiff's work. The court noted that if such an appropriation were to be
considered lawful:
it is plain no protection whatsoever could be given to any work in the nature of a
gazetteer, dictionary, road book, calendar, map or any other work the subject matter
of which is open to common observation and enquiry, and that every man who had
bestowed any amount of labour and expense in collecting and arranging the
information requisite for the production of such a work, might immediately on its
publication, be deprived of the fruit of his industry and ability.202
There was a keen appreciation that such an outcome could act as a
disincentive to the creation of informational works, and thus was an undesirable
consequence. This sensitivity to the incentivesaccess dilemma can be explained
by the fact that the natural rights basis for copyright was still strong during this
early period.2 03 The courts were keen to see that a creator was not deprived of the
"fruits of his labors." At the same time they were also highly conscious that the
grant of copyright was not the conferral of an unlimited monopoly. Rather,
copyright was seen as a "deal" struck between the originator and the state. The
197 Emerson, 8 F. Cas. at 619.
198 Gray, 10F. Cas. at 1035.
199 4 H.C.L. 815; 10 Eng. Rep. 681 (1854).
200 See Kreiss, supra note 44 (espousing a very similar view).
201 2 Beav. 6; 48 Eng. Rep. 1080 (1839).
2 02 Lewis v. Fullarton, 2 Beav. 6,9; 48 Eng. Rep. 1080, 1081 (1839).
203 Yen, supra note 45, at 517 (pointing out the eighteenth and nineteenth-century cases
showed an appreciation for the natural rights, as well as the economic incentives, which formed
the basis for the grant of copyright protection).
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originator was assured of the right to exploit his or her creation, in return for the
dissemination of new works to the public.20 4 This view can be seen in Sayre v.
Moore,20 5 an action alleging copyright infringement in sea charts. Lord
Mansfield, CJ., said that the principle in such a case was "of great consequence"
to the nation. The court had to be careful to guard against two equally prejudicial
extremes: 'That men of ability, who have employed their time for the service of
the community, may not be deprived of their just merits, and the reward for their
ingenuity and labor, the other, that the world may not be deprived of
improvements, nor the progress of the arts be retarded."206
The third rationale for the easy grant of copyright was the belief that the
origin of the property right granted was in production.207 Production was the
result of the labor-be that effort or creativity-bestowed upon the work 208
204 "That every man is entitled to the fruits of his own labour must be admitted but he can
enjoy them only, except by statutory provision, under the rules of property, which regulate
society, and which define the rights of things in general." Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591,658
(1834). The public purposes of the grant of copyright are clearly seen in the preambles of early
United States copyright statutes cited in that case.
205 102 Eng. Rep. 139 n.b.
206 Thus, His Honor noted that copyright "guards against the piracy of... words and
sentiments" but did not prohibit writing on a similar subject.' Sayre v. Moore, cited in Eng.
Rep. 139 n.b; see also Gyles v. Wilcox, 2 Atk. 141, 143; 26 Eng. Rep. 489, 490 (1740). In
Sayre, the Lord Chancellor was of the opinion that the Statute of Anne:
[o]ught to receive a liberal construction, for it is very far from being a monopoly, as it is
intended to secure the property of books in the authors themselves, or the purchasers of the
copy, as some recompense for their pains and labour in such works as may be of use to the
learned world.
Id.
207 This was a belief held by both the courts and the legislature. For an example of the
courts' acceptance of this view see Jeffery's v. Boosey, 4 H.L.C. 815, 867; 10 Eng. Rep. 581,
702 (1854), and later cases, such as Exchange Telegraph Co. Ltd v. Gregory & Company, I
QJB. 147 (1896). In the United States context, see the discussion of counsel in WHeaton v.
Peters, 33 U.S. at 591. Originality as meaning merely independent creation was upheld in
Hutchinson Telephone Co. v. Frontier Directory Co., 770 F.2d 128, 131-32 (8th Cir. 1985):
Hutchinson's records are gathered and maintained for many purposes, including publication of a
directory. The proper focus is not whether Hutchinson's sole motivation for maintaining the
records is the publication of a directory, but whether the directory itself is derived from
information compiled and generated by Hutchinson's efforts. That Hutchinson alone solicited,
gathered, filed, sorted, and maintained the information on which the directory is based is
undisputed.
For an example of legislative acceptance of the view, see the preamble to the 1783
Massachusetts Copyright Act quoted in WHeaton, 33 U.S. at 681 ("there being no property
more peculiarly a man's own, than that which is produced by the labour of his mind!).
208 VHeaton, 33 U.S. at 657:
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The great principle on which the author's right rests, is, that it is the fruit or
production of his own labour, and which may, by the labour of the faculties of the
mind, establish a right of property, as well as by the faculties of the body;, and it is
difficult to perceive any well founded objection to such a claim of right 20 9
Such views were a consequence of the influence of Roman natural law, and
the principle of occupancy as the primary form of acquisition.2 10 This was
reinforced by the work of Locke, in particular his notion that "a person who
mixed her labor with an unowned object became morally entitled to property in
that object."211 As a result, in premodem copyright, a person could claim
ownership in her work to the extent that her labor resulted in its existence 212
The "mental labor" protected by copyright encompassed both investment and
creativity. It comprehended both "sweat of the brow"213 and the "creativity" that
may be found in the presentation of the content 214 With regard to compilations,
the grant of copyright was not made for a bare list. A compiler could not claim
any right to the information in a compilation that was derived from the stock of
common knowledge. He or she could claim copyright only if the compilation was
The argument that a literary man is as much entitled to the product of his labour as any other
member of society, cannot be controverted. And the answer is, that he realises this product by
the transfer of his manuscripts, or in the sale of his works, when first published.
2 09 Id. at 669-70 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
210 yen, supra note 45, at 522. This view can be seen in the argument of counsel for the
defendant in Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 626:
Analogous rights, if such they may be called, are nothing without actual possession and use.
Light and air, and a part of the great ocean, may be claimed and held, as long as necessary for
the occupant; but abandon the immediate occupation, and the exclusive power and exclusive
possession are gone together.
211 Yen, supra note 45, at 523.
212 Yen, supra note 45, at 524; see also Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 672 (Thompson, J.,
dissenting) ("Every principle of justice, equity, morality, fitness and sound policy concurs, in
protecting the literary labours of men, to the same extent that property acquired by manual
labour is protected").
213 That is, the time, expense, and labor embodied in the compilation. See also Wheaton,
33 U.S. at 657-58:
In what respect does the right of an author differ from that of an individual who has invented a
most useful and valuable machine? In the production of this, his mind has been as intensely
engaged, as long, and, perhaps, as usefully to the public, as any distinguished author in the
composition of his book. The result of their labours may be equally beneficial to society, and in
their respective spheres they may be alike distinguished for mental vigour.
214 Mawman v. Tegg, 2 Russ. 385; 39 Eng. Rep. 380 (1826).
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the result in some respect of independent work on his or her part.2 15 This
"independent work," however, could encompass the gathering and compiling of
information; or it could encompass a new and creative presentation of an existing
body of information. Thus, in Lamb v. Evans, the plaintiff could gain copyright
protection for his labor and expense incurred in compiling The International
Guide to British and Foreign Merchants and Manufacturers2 16 In Mawman v.
Tegg, the plaintiff was granted copyright protection for the plan and arrangement
of his encyclopedia.217
This two-fold nature of copyright protection changed over time. During the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the protection of effort per se,
receded. Greater stress was placed upon individualism and the author's presence
in a final product. Arguments for protection were stronger the more a creator was
"embodied" in the final product.218 Conversely, the argument for protection was
considered to be weak where there was little evidence of authorial personality.
This brings us to the decision in Feist and its disparagement of "sweat of the
brow" as a basis for copyright. Contrary to the view expressed in Feist, however,
"sweat of the brow" does not necessarily entail the grant of a proprietary right in
facts. A distinction must be drawn, as a number of commentators have
observed,219 between the grant of copyright and infringement of copyright. This
was the crux of the early copyright cases, and the distinction between modem
"sweat of the brow" cases and premodern copyright.
C. Infringement
Although premodern cases were quick to grant copyright protection, the
scope of infringement was considerably narrower than in modem cases. This was
because there was a wider notion of what constituted legitimate use. In modem
copyright cases, a plaintiff need establish only substantial similarity and access-
or a "causal connection"-in order to establish infiingement.220 In such cases,
215 Leslie v. . Young & Sons, (1894) A.C. 335.
216 Lamb v. Evans, I Ch. 218, CA (1893); see also Drury v. Ewing, 7 F. Cas. 1113, 1116
(C.C.S.D. Ohio 1862) (No. 4,095); Scott v. Stanford, 3 L.R.-Eq. 718 (1867); Gray v. Russell,
10 F. Cas. 1035 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 5,728).
217 In support of this view, see Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass.
1845) (No. 4,436); see also Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8,136)
(although by this time, the distinction between arrangement on the one hand and sweat of the
brow on the other was becoming more obvious); Mawman v. Tegg, 2 Russ. 385; 39 Eng. Rep.
380 (1826).
218 Sherman & Bently, supra note 23, at 145.
219 See, e.g., Gorman, supra note 75; Denicola, supra note 75.
220 Corelli v. Gray, (1913) 29 T.L.R. 570; Francis Day & Hunter Ltd. v. Bron, (1963) Ch.
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courts will find infringement almost without regard to the context or the manner
in which the defendant reuses the plaintiff's work.221 This relatively wide notion
of authors' rights is a further consequence of the growth in individualism and
concern for authorial presence,222 discussed above.
The premodem cases took a much narrower view of infringement. The right
granted by premodern copyright was the right to multiply copies of the original
work 223 Copyright signified "the sole right of printing, publishing and selling"
literary compositions. Authors generally were not granted derivative rights in a
work.2 24 An illustration of this principle can be seen in Stowe v. Thomas.2 25 The
alleged infringement in this case was a translation of Stowe's novel, Uncle Tom's
Cabin. The action for breach of copyright was unsuccessful. In regard to the
rights conferred by copyright, the court said:
The author's exclusive property in the creation of his mind cannot be vested in the
author as abstractions, but only in the concrete form which he has given them, and the
language in which he has clothed them. When he has sold his book, the only property
which he reserves to himsell, or which the law gives to him, is the exclusive right to
multiply the copies of that particular combination of characters which exhibits to the
eyes of another the ideas intended to be conveyed. That is what the law terms copy, or
copyright.226
As the right bestowed was merely to multiply copies, and enjoy the resulting
profits, in questions of infringement:
the inquiry is not whether the defendant has used the thoughts, conceptions,
information or discoveries promulgated by the original, but whether his composition
maybe considered a new work, requiring invention, learning and judgment, or only a
221 Lunney, supra note 22, at 534. This is because of the expansion of authors' rights.
222 Yen, supra note 45, at 519; see also Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value, supra
note 4, at 1882.
223 The Statute of Anne, (1710) 8 Anne, ch. 19, § 1, conferred the sole right of printing or
reprinting.
224 Under modem copyright, low authorship works are entitled to the exclusive rights of
copyright, including the right to prepare derivative works. See Reichman, supra note 19, at 813.
He argues that almost by definition, these works contain little or no personal expression and this
negates the classic justification for a strong adaptation right. However, judicial decisions have
prevented competitors from using preexisting compilations as starting points to save time,
money or effort, or from exploiting disparate factual contents of preexisting works in creating
different and sometimes noncompeting works.
225 Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201 (C.C.E.D. Penn. 1853) (No. 13,514); see also
Greene v. Bishop, 10 F. Cas. 1128 (C.C.D. Mass. 1858) (No. 5,763).
226 Stowe, 23 F. Cas. at 206--07.
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mere transcript of the whole or parts of the original, with merely colorable
variations.2 27
Infringement in the premodern cases had two components. A plaintiff had to
establish, firstly, appropriation. He or she was required to prove that a defendant
availed himself or herself of the mental labor embodied in the plaintiffs work
without adequately compensating the plaintiff. The plaintiff then had to establish
illegitimate use. He or she needed to show that the defendant's use was calculated
to interfere seriously with the market 228 for the plaintiff's work
1. Appropriation
For the purposes of establishing infringement, appropriation could be of two
types: wholesale appropriation, or the appropriation of a significant part of the
work Wholesale appropriation of a work was relatively easily judged. A servile
imitation of the original work would certainly attract censure.2 29 Similarly, the
incorporation of the whole, or a large portion of the whole into a larger work in a
"mosaic"-like manner230 would also constitute piracy.23 1
Where less than the entirety of the work was taken, infringement depended
upon such considerations as the value of the materials taken, and the importance
of it to the sale of the original work.232 In Folsom v. Mars,23 3 the plaintiff alleged
copyright infringement in a twelve-volume compilation of the Writings of
President Washington. The defendant had reproduced verbatim 353 pages from
866 of the plaintiffs work Many of the letters contained in the original had never
been published before. The court said:
227 Id
228 See, e.g., Drury v. Ewing, 7 F. Cas. 1113, 1116 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1862) (No. 4,095)
(noting that the issue was whether the alleged piracy rendered the original 'less valuable by
superseding its use in any degree"). In this case, the fact that a second work was an
improvement on the first was not a sufficient reason to prevent a finding of copyright
infringement See also Mawman v. Tegg, 2 Russ. 385,400; 38 Eng. Rep. 380, 386 (including a
discussion by Lord Chancellor Eldon where he explained the remedy of account of profits and
the rule of Drury is implicitly accepted).
229 Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 620 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436); Leslie v. J.
Young & Sons (1894) A.C. 335.
230 As opposed to the work being 'fused' or synthesized into the new work. Folsom v.
Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342,348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).
231 Gray v. Russell, 10 F. Cas. 1035, 1037 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 5,728); Emerson, 8
F. Cas. at 625; Greene v. Bishop, 10 F. Cas. 1128, 1134 (C.C.D. Mass. 1858) (No. 5,763).
232 Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 345; Story v. Holcombe, 23 F. Cas. 171, 173 (C.C.D. Ohio 1847)
(No. 13,497).
233 Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 342.
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It is certainly not necessary, to constitute an invasion of copyright that the whole of a
work should be copied, or even a large portion of it in form or substance. If so much
is taken, that the value of the original is sensibly diminished, or the labors of the
original author are substantially to an injurious extent appropriated by another, that is
sufficient in point of law, to constitute a piracy pro tanto. The entirety of the copyright
is the property of the author, and it is no defence, that another person has appropriated
a part, and not the whole, of any property. Neither does it necessarily depend upon the
quantity taken, whether it is an infringement of the copyright or not It is often
affected by other considerations, the value of the materials taken, and the importance
of it to the sale of the original work. 234
Use of another's material per se was not actionable.2 3 5 The issue was one of the
use to which the material was put.
2. An Illegitimate Use
The central issue in the premodern cases was whether the defendant's use of
the work was a legitimate one, "in the fair exercise of a mental operation and
deserving the character of an original work."236 In the premodern cases, fair use
was a general standard against which to assess infringement. It was not merely a
defense to an allegation of infiingement as it is today.2 37 In Hotten v. Arthur,23 8
Hotten produced a catalogue of his books. He alleged that the defendants, rival
booksellers, infringed this copyright. In finding infringement the court said:
the only fair use you can make of the work of another of this kind is where you take a
number of such works; catalogues, dictionaries, digests &c; and look over them all
and then compile an original work ofyour own, founded on the information you have
extracted from each and all of them; but it is of vital importance that such new work
should have no mere copying, no merely colourable alterations, no blind repetition of
obvious errors.2 39
In this case, however, there had been wholesale piracy. The defendant availed
himself of the plaintiffs labour to supply the same article to the public, but at a
234 Id at 345; see also Bramwell v. Halcomb, 3 Mylne & Co. 737, 738 (1836); Saunders
v. Smith, 3 Mylne & Co. 711,736,737 (1838) (referred to in the Court's judgment).
235 Cary v. Kearsley, 4 Esp 168, 170; 170 Eng. Rep. 679, 680 (1802); see also Webb v.
Power, 29 F. Cas. 511,517,519 (C.C.D. Mass. 1847) (No. 17,323).
236 Bramwell, 3 Mylne & Co. at 738; Wilkins v. Aikin, 17 Ves 422, 426; 34 Eng. Rep.
163,165.
2 3 7 Lunney, supra note 22, at 546-48.
238 1H & M 603; 71 Eng. Rep. 264.
239Id at 609.
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lower price. On the other hand, in Webb v. Powers240 legitimate use was made of
the plaintiff's work. The plaintiff alleged that copyright had been infringed in her
work, Flora's Dictionary. Although aspects of the plaintiff's work had been
copied, "the main intent was to make a much cheaper work, and one with original
poetry, rather than colorably to republish the plaintiff's or any similar book' 2 41
It was open to any person to produce a work similar to the original, but it
must in substance be a new and original work. 242 Mere reproduction of an
original work was infiingement. There had to be some public benefit in the use of
the original work by a second comer. A mere republication, even if it were to be
cheaper than the original,243 did not serve the public interest.244 Thus, it was said
in Webb v. Powers that:
if great errors have not previously existed, or unusual ignorance to be corrected, no
great novelty is practicable or useful; unless it be to add new discoveries or
inventions, new names, or words, or decisions-so as to post up the subject to more
recent periods--or unless it be to abridge and omit details, and condense a more
voluminous work into a smaller and cheaper form, so as to bring its purchase and use
within the reach of new and less wealthy classes in society. Some similarities, and
240 29 F. Cas. 511, 517 (C.C.D. Mass. 1847) (No. 17,323).
24 1 Id. at 520-21. The distinction between the two works was expressed rather colorfully
by Judge Woodbury-
Both of these works are flowers, and not destitute of charms; but one is more like the magnolia
grandiflora orjaponica in size and attraction, and the other, like the wayside violet or anemone.
They both come from females, with loveliness peculiar to their sex; but they still essentially
differ, as one develops matronly experience and more ripened graces, while the other is just
opening her buds and blossoms.
Id. at 518.
242 Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201,207 (C.C.E.D. Penn. 1853) (No. 13,514)
The inquiry is not, whether the defendant has used the thoughts, conceptions, information or
discoveries promulgated by the original, but whether his composition may be considered a new
work, requiring invention, learning and judgment, or only a mere transcript of the whole or parts
of the original, with merely colourable variations.
243 Scott v. Stanford, 3 L.R.-Eq. 718,723-24 (1867).
244 Bartlett v. Crittendon, 2 F. Cas. 967, 969 (C.C.D. Ohio 1849) (No. 1,076):
IT]he author who publishes his word, dedicates it to the public. He voluntarily incurs all the
responsibility of a publisher. His object is to instruct or amuse mankind, and the more his work
is circulated, the greater is the compliment to his ability as a writer. There is no reason, then,
against a republication of the work by any one, except that it may reduce the profits of the
author.
See also Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879) ("The very object of publishing a book on
science or the useful arts is to communicate to the world the useful knowledge which it
contains.").
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some use ofprior works, even to copying of small parts, are in such cases tolerated, if
the main design and execution are in reality novel or improved, and not a mere cover
for important piracies from others.245
On this basis, a defendant was welcome to use an original work to produce a
new work of benefit to the public.2 46 As was noted above, in this particular case,
the defendant's work, although it copied features of the plaintiffs, was quite
different from the plaintiff's work; and, in any case, was suited to a "different and
humbler class of readers.'2 47 The court considered the use of the original work as
"legitimate." On the other hand, use of an original work was found to be
illegitimate, as in Hotten v. Arthur, where the second work would serve as a
substitute24 8 for the original or prejudice24 9 the original in the market.2 50 Thus,
protection was primarily against commercial and competitive use.2 5 1
In assessing infringement, many courts looked to the animus furandi, the
intention to steal: if present, this would establish infringement.252 In Cary v.
Kearsley,2 53 Lord Ellenborough said that finding part of the work of one author in
the work of another was not sufficient to support the action. Anyone could fairly
adopt part of the work from another, or use another's labor for the "promotion of
science and the benefit of the public." However, the question was whether a work
was taken with such a view, and without the animusfirandi:
That part of the work of one author is found in another, is not of itself piracy, or
sufficient to support an action; a man may fairly adopt part of the work from another;
he may so make use of another's labours for the promotion of science, and the benefit
of the public; but having done so, the question will be: Was the matter so taken used
fairly with that view, and without what I may term the animusfurandi?
245 Webb, 29 F. Cas. at 517; see also Trusler v. Muray, 1 East, 363; Gray v. Russell, 12
Ves. 270; 16 Ves. 269; 17 Ves. 422.
246 Hogg v. Kirby, 8 Ves Jun 215; 32 Eng. Rep. 336; 34 Eng. Rep. 1013 (1803); see also
Jarrold v. Houlston, 3 K & J 708; 69 Eng. Rep. 1294 (1857).
247 Webb, 29 F. Cas. at 518.
2 48 Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901); Story v.
Halcombe 23 F. Cas. 171 (C.C.D. Ohio 1847) (No. 13,497); Roworth v. Wilkes, I Camp. 94,
98; 170 Eng. Rep. 889,890 (1807).
2 49 Dodsley v. Kinnersley, I Amb. 403; 27 Eng. Rep. 270 (1761).
250 Greene v. Bishop, 10 F. Cas. 1128, 1134 (C.C.D. Mass. 1858) (No. 5,763).
251 The test in Folsom v. Marsh was whether the second work would "prejudice the sale,
or diminish the profits, or superseded the objects, of the original work." 9 F. Cas. at 348.
252 But see Story, 23 F Cas at 173 (stating that the intention was irrelevant).
253 4 Esp. 168, 170, 170 Eng. Rep. 679,680 (1802).
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The converse was not true however. Lack of guilty intent could exonerate a
defendant.254 A defendant could be liable for infringement, even if there was no
animusfurandi,255 if much of an original work had been taken and the new work
was a mere substitute for the original2 5 6 or prejudiced the original.2 57 In Scott v.
Stanford,258 Scott was clerk and registrar of the Coal Market of the City of
London. As such, he published certain statistical returns relating to the
importation of coal. He alleged copyright in his work was infringed by Stanford.
Around one third of Stanford's book, Mineral Statistics for the use of Great
Britain and Ireland, was reproduced verbatim from Scott's publications. Sir Page
Wood VC said that if the bulk of a plaintiff's publication had been appropriated
and published in a form that would materially injure his copyright, mere honest
intention on the part of the appropriator would not suffice to avoid a finding of
infringement.
The test for illegitimate use was stated in various ways. In Webb v.
Powers,259 the test was stated as being:
Whether the book of the defendants, taken as a whole, is substantially a copy of the
plaintiff's? Whether it has virtually the same plan and character throughout, and is
intended to supersede the other in the market with the same class of readers and
purchasers, by introducing no considerable new matter, or little or nothing new,
except colourable deviations?
In Lawrence v. Dana,260 the test was stated as follows: was so much of the
original taken "that the value of the original is sensibly diminished, or the labors
of the original author are substantially, to an injurious extent, appropriated by
another?" In deciding the question, the court should look to the nature and objects
of the selection made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the
254 See Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 27 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8,136); see also
Scott v. Stanford, 3 L.R.-Eq. 718,723 (1867):
mere honest intention on the part of the appropriator will not suffice, as the Court can only look
at the result, and not the intention in the man's mind at the time of doing the act complained of;
and he must be presumed to intend all that the publication of his work effects.
255 Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 625 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436) (finding
infringement even though there was no determination that the defendants acted without good
faith).
256 Webb v. Powers, 29 F. Cas. 511, 517 (C.C.D. Mass. 1847) (No. 17,323); Folsom v.
Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342,348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).
257 Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 348.
258 3 L.R.-Eq 718 (1867).
259 29 F. Cas. at 511.
260 15F. Cas. 26,76-77 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869).
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"degree in which the use may prejudice the sale or diminish the profits, or
supersede the objects of the original work" In Saunders v. Smith,261 the defense
argued that the questions to be asked were: is the subsequent work new and
original? Is it published with piratical intent? If so, can this work become a
substitute for the old one?
Despite these variations in the test to be used, these formulations show a
widespread agreement. Was the work a bona fide attempt to provide the public
with something new and useful, or was the second work a mere appropriation of
the first that would prejudice or supersede the original work in the marketplace?
2. The Implications for Second Comers
The effect of the decisions in the premodern cases was that a published work
was open to legitimate use by others,262 provided that the work was not
essentially a republication of the original. A second comer could use a preexisting
work in one of three ways: first, a second comer could use the original work to
create something completely new, which gave the public something that the
original work did not. Thus, in Sayre v. Moore,263 the defendant had taken the
body of his sea charts from the plaintiffis work, but had made many alterations
and improvements to it This was sufficient to avoid infringement. A prior work
could serve as the basis for a new work To be used legitimately, it should be
"fused" into that work, rather than incorporated in a "mosaic" manner,2 64 unless
the quantity taken was insubstantial. Alternatively, a second comer could use the
original work to produce a new work that did not compete with the original work
in the market; as in Webb v. Powers. Thus, most bona fide abridgments,265
261 3 Mylne & Co. 711, 40 Eng. Rep. 1100.
262 Greene v. Bishop, 10 F. Cas. 1128, 1133 (C.C.D. Mass. 1858) (No. 5,763); see also
Kreiss, supra note 42, at 42 n.146 (observing the modem fair use doctrine was developed in the
nineteenth century in the context of allowing competitors to make use of copyrighted work).
263 1 East 361 n.140.
264 Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342,348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).
265 Bell v. Walker & Debrett, I Bro. C.C. 452; 28 Eng. Rep. 1235 (1985); Folsom, 9 F.
Cas at 342; Story v. Holcombe, 23 F. Cas. 171 (C.C.D. Ohio 1847) (No. 13,497). As the
counsel for the defense in Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591 (1834) stated:
An abridgement fairly done, is itself authorship, requires mind; and is not an infringement, no
more than another work on the same subject.... Abridgements are the efforts of different
minds. A bona fide abridgement was one that was a "real substantial condensation of the
materials" and not a "facile use of the scissors."
See Dodsley v. Kinnersley, I Anb. 403, 405; 27 Eng. Rep. 270, 271 (1761) ("No certain line
can be drawn, to distinguish a fair abridgement; but every case must depend upon its own
circumstances.:); see also Macklin v. Richardson, 27 Eng. Rep. 451 (1990) (noting the
reproduction of one act of a play, with an undertaking to print the second act, was considered to
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reviews,266 and digests were not infringements because they did not seek to serve
as substitutes for the original work.267 However, where a work purported to be an
abridgement, review, or digest, but would really serve as a substitute for the
original work, infringement would be made out. This was the case in Roworth v.
Wilkes,268 where the plaintiff alleged breach of copyright in his book The Art of
Defence on Foot with the Broadsword. The defendants had reproduced much of
his work in their Encyclopaedia Londinensis. Lord Ellenborough said:
The question is, whether the defendant's publication would serve as a substitute for
it? A Review will not in general serve as a substitute for the book reviewed; and even
there, if so much is extracted that it communicates the same knowledge with the
original work, it is an actionable violation of literary property. The intention to pirate
is not necessary in an action of this sort; it is enough that the publication complained
of is in substance a copy, whereby a work vested in another is prejudiced. A
compilation of this kind may differ from a treatise published by itself, but there must
be certain limits fixed to its transcripts; it must not be allowed to sweep up all modem
works; or an Encyclopaedia would be a recipe for completely breaking down literary
property. Here 75 pages have been transcribed out of 118, and that which the plaintiff
sold for half-a-guinea may be bought of the defendant for eightpence.2 69
If a subsequent author wanted to create an essentially identical work that
directly competed with the original in the market, he or she had two choices. The
second comer could compensate the originator for that use; or he or she could
repeat the original research process. This latter requirement is known as the
verification rule. A second comer who wanted to compete against the originator
be the work itself, and not an abridgement, as the defendant had argued); see also Tonson v.
Walker, 3 Swan. 672, 681, 36 Eng. Rep. 1018, 1020 (1952) (work in question was not a fair
abridgment but a "mere evasion'); Gyles v. Wilcox, 2 Atk. 141, 143; 26 Eng. Rep. 489, 490
(1740) (stating that where books are "colorably shortened" only, that would not constitute a
bona fide abridgment, but this should not be carried so far as to restrain people from making a
real abridgment, "for abridgments may with great propriety be called a new book, because not
only the paper and print, but the invention, learning, and judgment of the author is shewn in
them, and in many cases are extremely useful"). But see Whittingham v. Wooler, 2 Wans. 428;
36 Eng. Rep. 679 (1817) (reproducing six pages out of forty of a farce in a magazine was not
considered actionable).
266 See statements by Lord Ellenborough in Roworth v. Wilkes, 1 Camp. 94, 98, 170 Eng.
Rep. 889, 890 (1807); Lord Chancellor Eldon in Wilkins v. Aikin, 17 Ves. Jun. 422, 424, 34
Eng. Rep. 163, 164 (as to what would constitute a "fair quotation').
267 Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 68 (C.C.D. Mass.) (No. 8,136); Stowe v. Thomas,
23 F. Cas. 201,207 (C.C.E.D. Penn.) (No. 13,514). But see Story v. Holcombe, 23 F. Cas. 171,
172-73 (C.C.D. Ohio 1847) (No. 13,497) (stating that the argument that an abridgement does
not seek to serve as a substitute to the original work was not satisfactory).
268 1 Camp 94; 170 Eng. Rep. 889 (1807).
2 69 Id. at 98.
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was also required to expend the labor and time, rather than cut comers by relying
upon the originator's work. As one case put it, a subsequent author must "count
the milestones" 270 for himself. This rule was disparaged in Feist as forcing a
second comer to waste time, effort and expense in duplicating the originator's
work.271 However, there were strong public policy reasons behind this view. In
Matthewson v. Stockdale,272 Lord Chancellor Erskine said:
The Defendant had not made a map from actual surveys; employing persons to
improve or correct; but took a copy, with merely colourable alterations. It might be
asked, how is it possible to have a Copyright in a Map of the Island of St Domingo?
Must not the mountains have the same position; the rivers the same course? Must not
the points of land, the coast connecting them, the names given by the inhabitants,
every thing constituting a map, be the same? All those objections were urged. The
answer was, that the subject of the plaintiff's claim was a map, made at great expense,
from actual surveys: distinguished from former maps by improvements, that were
manifest the defendant's map was a servile imitation; requiring no expence, no
ingenuity; possessing nothing, that could confer copyright.
Must not the latitude and longitude of the several points upon the adjoining
shores, and the soundings, be the same, as they were placed by nature? They must be
the same; or the chart must destroy the mariner. What room can there be for
originality upon such a subject? That may be a reason for not making a new chart or
map: but it is no reason for a servile imitation.273
The rule was based upon the policy of encouraging the production of new goods.
The courts should not encourage the reproduction of servile imitations made so as
to undercut the originator in the marketplace.
A second public policy behind the rule was that it was in the public interest
that errors in existing works should be corrected. In the case of maps and sea
charts, as in Sayre v. Moore,274 the court's view was that if an erroneous chart had
270 Kelly v. Morris, I L.R.-Eq. 697,701 (1866). As Sir W. Paige Wood V.C., stated:
In the case of a dictionary, map, guide-book, or directory, when there are certain common
objects of information which must, if described correctly, be described in the same words, a
subsequent compiler is bound to set about doing for himself that which the first compiler has
done. In case of a rad-book, he must count the milestones for himself.
271 Litman, supra note 46, at 1016 (arguing that the verification rule was the courts'
intuitive response to the unlikely occurrence that an author would make an inadvertent use of
directory listings because people do not ordinarily learn the contents of directories). This is
perhaps true, but the cases also show strong public policy reasons for their decisions.
272 12 Ves. Jun. 270; 33 Eng. Rep. 103, 104-05 (1806).
273 See similar comments in Lamb v. Evans, I Ch. 218 (1893) (stating that despite the
likelihood that fact-based works on the same subject will contain significantly similar
information, an originator can stop a second comer from copying his or her work).
274 1 East 361 n.140.
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been made, "God forbid it should not be corrected even in a small degree, if it
thereby become more serviceable and useful for the purposes to which it is
applied."275 However, the verification rule could not be used to mask an
appropriation. In Moffatt & Paige Ltd v. George Gill & Sons Ltd v. Frances
Marshall,27 6 the plaintiffs alleged infingement of annotated editions of
Shakespeare's plays. Collins MR, relying upon premodern copyright cases,277
said that the verification rule did not allow the defendant to merely look up and
verify quotations. It did not entitle him to "annex the skill and judgment and taste
which... dictated the selection.2 78
In summary, then, premodem copyright granted copyright protection
relatively easily, on the basis of mental labor. Mental labor could encompass
either sweat of the brow or creativity. The easy grant of copyright did not
however, give a proprietary right in facts. Inf-ingement was made out only if there
was an appropriation of the original work and an illegitimate use made of that
appropriation. An illegitimate use was one where the second work would
substitute for the original work or prejudice it in the market. There was no penalty
imposed on a second comer who relied bona fide upon the originator's work in
order to produce a new work. Legitimate use by those engaged in research or
other non-competing uses was also permitted. It was also open to a subsequent
author to produce an identical competing work. To do so, she had either to
compensate the originator or undertake the research process for herself.
a. A Model of Database Protection Based upon the Premodern
Copyright Cases
The premodem model offers an alternative model to existing copyright 279
The advantages of a model based upon the premodem cases are best understood
by comparing such a model with existing copyright and sui generis models.
275 Similarly, in the later case of Moffatt & Paige Ltdl v. George Gill & Sons Ltd v.
Frances Marshall, 86 L.T. 465, 471 (1902), Collins MR said that the verification rule did not
allow the defendant merely to look up and verify quotations, thus entitling him "to annex the
skill andjudgment and taste which had dictated the selection:'
276 86 L.T. 465 (1902).
277 Jarrold v. Houlston, 3 K & J 708, 69 Eng. Rep. 1294 (1857); Lewis v. Fullarton, 2
Beav.6; 48 Eng. Rep. 1080 (1839); Longman v. Winchester, Ves. Jun. 272, Eng. Rep. 988.
278 See Litman, supra note 46, at 1016 (pointing out that the verification rule did not
remove facts from the public domain; it simply prohibited a single, albeit more efficient route,
to unearthing them).
279 This model would be in keeping with the recommendation of DIGrAL DILMA,
supra note 18, at xxix-xxx, as to the possibility of an alternative foundation for copyright:
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The premodem model would provide significantly more protection to
databases than does the model of copyright used in Feist. This model would not
require "creativity" in addition to "originality" in order to confer copyright
protection upon databases. On the other hand, the premodem model would
provide significantly narrower protection than is available under the "sweat of the
brow" cases such as Waterlow. It would not confer a "derivative" or "adaptation"
right nor would it stop others from using a database as the basis for a new work,
provided that work is not a mere piracy of the original. It would still be open to
second comers to use the original work under license from the originator, or to
recreate the database themselves. Fair use would not, however, be a defense, but
would be central to the issue of infringement: uses apart from illegitimate uses,
would be retained.
The premodem model would provide significantly more public access to
databases than would most existing sui generis models. The premodern model
would allow access not only for traditional fair use purposes, but also for
competitors to produce new and better databases. The onus would be upon the
plaintiff to establish that the defendant had appropriated the database and used it
for an illegitimate purpose. Further, protection would not be perpetual. A database
that is significantly amended may obtain protection as a new work The old
database upon which it is based, however, would come into the public domain at
the expiry of the copyright period.2 80
The committee suggests exploring whether or not the notion of copy is an appropriate
foundation for copyright law, and whether a new foundation can be constructed for copyright,
based on the goal set forth in the Constitution ("promote the progress of science and the useful
arts") and a tactic by which it is achieved, namely, providing incentive to authors and
publishers. In this framework, the question would not be whether a copy had been made, but
whether a use of a work was consistent with that goal and tactic (i.e., did it contribute to the
desired "progress" and was it destructive, when taken alone or aggregated with other similar
copies, of an author's incentive?). This concept is similar to fair use but broader in scope, as it
requires considering the range of factors by which to measure the impact of the activity on
authors, publishers, and others.
280 A similar view that the duration of protection should be limited can be found in Sanks,
supra note 5, at 1013. In general, copyright has always treated attempts to gain a perpetual
monopoly by making some alterations to an original copyright work with some suspicion. See,
e.g., Black v. Murray, 9 M. 341 (1870) (suggesting that "extensive and substantial"
amendments to an existing work were necessary to sustain a proposition that a work was
deserving of copyright protection as a "new edition"); see also Interlego Ag v. Tyco Indus.,
Inc., A.C. 217 (1989) (noting that the Privy Council rejected the attempts of a copyright owner
to obtain effectively a perpetual monopoly by redrawing the same component with minimal
visual alterations). But see Blacklock v. Pearson, 2 Ch. 376, 383 (1915) (suggesting that a book
of constantly changing subject matter may give rise to a new work as the subject matter
changed).
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The premodem model may also have some advantages over unfair
competition models. Unlike H.R. 1858, the right of action would lie with the
plaintiff. Because the model confers a copyright, an action for infringement could
also lie against the information Samaritan who, by his or her actions, prejudiced
the database in the market.2 81 In addition, courts have traditionally had relatively
little difficulty in determining both the grant of copyright and infringement in
"sweat of the brow" copyright. Unfair competition jurisprudence has proved to be
more controversial.
A premodem model may need, however, to be "tweaked" in a number of
ways. As I said at the outset, my intention in writing this paper was not to develop
a comprehensive legislative model of database protection. I do have some
suggestions as to additions and alterations to such a model that seem desirable.
First, the duration of the right would not need to be as long as in traditional
copyright A five to ten year protection period would seem adequate.2 82
Second, databases that are inaccessible, or largely inaccessible to the public,
pose particular problems regardless of the form of protection. It would be open to
incorporate in a sui generis scheme some measures to ensure that inaccessible
commercialized databases are brought into the public domain. This could be done
in a variety of ways. Some commentators have suggested compulsory licensing
schemes for databases that are of significance to the public.2 83 Kreiss has
suggested a wider interpretation of fair use2 8 4 and the withholding of injunctions
to ensure that information is accessible. It would also be possible to incorporate
provisions similar to those of the EU that would void contractual provisions that
deny public access for legitimate purposes.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper I have argued for a copyright-based model of database
protection because of the premises upon which copyright is based. These
281 Some support for this view is to be found in the decision of Ager v. Peninsular &
Oriental Navigation Co., 26 Ch. D. 637 (1884) (noting that the plaintiffpublished the "Standard
Telegram Code" and alleged its copyright in this work was infringed by the defendant, whose
book was not sold or exported, but distributed for free to the defendant's agents). The court
found copyright infringement was made out. If this were not to be found an infringement of
copyright, anyone to whom the defendant gave the book could inform the whole world of the
plaintiff's work, thus rendering his book comparatively useless. it at 642.
282 See Sanks, supra note 5, at 1013 (taking a similar view on this point, arguing that a
shorter period is in line with the realization that new computer technology is outdated
approximately every one to two years).
283 See, e.g., Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value, supra note 4, at 1923;
Hunsucker, supra note 13, at 751 n273.
284 This would already be part of a scheme based upon premodem copyright principles.
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premises are: copyright assumes a quid pro quo in which the privilege of a limited
monopoly is given in return for public access to the copyright work; copyright
seeks to maintain a healthy stock of common knowledge from which all authors
may draw; and copyright's goal is to promote learning and progress, not to create
private monopolies in ideas or information.
Most sui generis models, however, grant the privilege of protection without a
corresponding assurance of public access. Both the consuming public (including
researchers) and potential competitors are restricted in the ways in which they
may extract and use database information. Further, that information may never
enter the public domain because of the possibility of perpetual protection. Such a
strongly protective regime may act as an incentive for investment so that we, as a
society, have more databases. A greater quantity of databases, however, may be
of little social benefit if those databases are not publicly accessible.
Having said that copyright is the preferred form of protection, however,
modem copyright does not provide the "Goldilocks just right" solution for
databases. Copyright as interpreted in Feist underprotects databases; copyright as
interpreted in Waterlow tends to overprotect databases, both in its term of
protection and in the scope of the rights granted.
I have suggested in this paper that premodern copyright cases provide an
alternative model for database protection. A sui generis scheme based upon the
principles of those cases would provide protection for databases against
illegitimate, primarily competing uses. However, such a scheme would encourage
legitimate uses, including the creation of new products by competitors. I have also
suggested that it may be desirable to make some additions and changes to such a
model. These changes would seek to preserve public access in the face of
contractual and technological means of denying such access. They would also
seek to ensure that the grant of protection is not excessive.
The focus of a sui generis scheme based upon premodern copyright
principles would be to protect databases against market failure. A considerable
degree of public access would be preserved. Most existing models of sui generis
protection, however, tend to be extreme reactions to a perceived underprotection
of databases. As such, they have the potential to undermine the common good by
granting exclusive monopolies in databases and the information they contain.
Such models are illustrations of the danger of neglecting the past in designing the
future.
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